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Introduction
FIRST-YEAR LAW STUDENTS are often shocked to discover that fol-
lowing the law routinely leads to injustice. Litigation, they learn, is a
zero sum game: a plaintiff claims injury; the defendant denies legal
responsibility; when the defendant triumphs, the plaintiff is left empty
handed, regardless of the equities. By pleading contributory negli-
gence, or the statute of limitations, or the business judgment rule, a
defendant, even a seemingly culpable defendant, can escape liability.
Justice is not handmaiden to the law in this scenario. The plaintiff
may well have suffered injury—blameworthy injury in fact. But where
the law does not recognize a legally cognizable wrong, the plaintiff has
no remedy. What is “fair” has no necessary relation to what is “legal.”
Inevitably this sparks outrage in the classroom. Students raise their
hands to protest that the outcome is “not right.” They soon realize,
however, that morality and law have little in common. In time—a re-
markably short time in fact—most stop questioning this at all.
The Securities and Exchange Commission’s 2010 civil complaint
against Goldman Sachs is but one illustration of the kind of case that
breeds cynicism in budding attorneys. The investment bank, “infa-
mously dubbed the ‘great vampire squid wrapped around the face of
humanity,’” was accused of defrauding clients by selling them a com-
plex financial instrument without disclosing that it was designed to
* Attorney, Baker Botts, L.L.P., Houston, Texas. J.D., M.A., and B.A. from Stanford
University. Former Law Clerk for the Honorable Priscilla R. Owen, United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The author wishes to thank Professor Norman Spaulding,
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883
884 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46
fail.1 Knowingly selling junk to customers that you’re expecting to
bust seems obviously wrong. Yet, as a number of journalists and com-
mentators have observed, it’s unclear whether Goldman’s employees
broke any laws.2 Strange as it seems, structured credit finance is a new
area of law with few precedents.3 Under the law, “it may not be illegal
for a bank to put together a package of toxic synthetic derivatives” for
sale to one customer, while simultaneously assisting another customer
in placing short bets that those same investments will blow up.4 And
no court has yet weighed in on this issue. In July 2010, Goldman—
without admitting any wrongdoing—agreed to pay $550 million to set-
tle the lawsuit, leaving only a single twenty-eight-year-old midlevel
banker, Fabrice Tourre, the self-proclaimed “Fabulous Fab,” on trial
for the crimes of an entire industry.5 To date, no high-profile partici-
pants in the 2008 financial meltdown have been prosecuted.6 And
while Fabrice Tourre’s fate remains unclear,7 the problem his case
raises is timeless. What, if anything, can judges do when faced with a
lawful injustice?
One notorious case provides an example. In Korematsu v. United
States, the Supreme Court, while upholding the wartime relocation
and internment of Japanese Americans, declared in dicta that “all le-
gal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are
immediately suspect.”8 A decade later, when the Court struck down
1. Shahien Nasiripour, Goldman Sachs Fraud Charges Could Be Just the Beginning, Say
Analysts, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 16, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/04/
16/goldman-sachs-fraud-charg_n_540934.html.
2. See, e.g., Miles Mogulescu, Comparing Goldman Sachs to a Casino Is an Insult to Casi-
nos, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/miles-
mogulescu/comparing-goldman-sachs-t_b_555275.html; Gillian Tett, Financial Reform in US
Could Be Buried Under a Mound of Paper, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2010), http://www.ft.com/
cms/s/0/5c8b517e-53f0-11df-aba0-00144feab49a.html.
3. Tobin Harshaw, Goldman’s Stacked Bet, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR (Apr. 16, 2010
8:50 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/16/goldmans-stacked-bet/.
4. Mogulescu, supra note 2.
5. Rich Blake, Goldman Sachs’ ‘Fabulous Fab’ Tourre Hung Out to Dry?, ABC NEWS (July
22, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/goldman-minion-faces-charges-powerhouse-
bank-paid-make/story?id=11229193; Louise Story & Gretchen Morgenson, S.E.C. Case
Stands Out Because It Stands Alone, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2011, at A1.
6. See Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, A Financial Crisis with Little Guilt, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 14, 2011, at A1; Editorial, On the Trail of Mortgage Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16,
2012, at A22; Edward Wyatt, S.E.C. Is Avoiding Touch Sanctions for Large Banks, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 3, 2012, at A1.
7. As of February 1, 2012, the SEC’s civil lawsuit against Tourre remains pending in
the Southern District of New York. See SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d 147
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (granting in part and denying in part Tourre’s motion to dismiss the
amended complaint).
8. 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
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segregation in Brown v. Board of Education and Bolling v. Sharp, it drew
upon this dicta to argue that racial classifications were inherently sus-
pect and required judicial scrutiny.9 Today, despite its status as dicta,
Korematsu’s language remains the standard justification for the strict
scrutiny of suspect categories.10
Korematsu offered a powerful new vocabulary for combating racial
discrimination,11 but a close reading of the opinion reveals significant
dissonance—a discordance that both shocks and puzzles. Indeed, the
Court’s dicta produces a decision seemingly at odds with itself. At first
blush, the outcome’s very logic is called into question. What explains
this paradoxical use of dicta? Is this just muddy thinking—or a legal
aporia with deeper significance?12
Despite its pervasive and longstanding survival in common law,
dicta is subject to serious criticism.13 It has been characterized as “triv-
ial,” “superfluous,” “ill-considered,” or worse—an abuse of judicial dis-
cretion that inevitably results in “bad law” and “confusion.”14 Other
9. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954); see also Neil Gotanda, “Other
Non-Whites” in American History: A Review of Justice at War, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1186, 1191
(1985) (reviewing PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR (1983)).
10. See, e.g., Gotanda, supra note 9, at 1192 (describing Korematsu as “the standard
precedential reference for strict judicial scrutiny of suspect categories”); see also Parents
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 758 (2007) (citing Korematsu
as the origin of the Supreme Court’s strict scrutiny language).
11. Jordan Steiker, American Icon: Does It Matter What the Court Said in Brown, 81 TEX.
L. REV. 305, 329 (2002) (reviewing JACK M. BALKIN, WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
SHOULD HAVE SAID (2001)).
12. In philosophy, an aporia is a seemingly insoluble contradiction in an inquiry, aris-
ing as a result of equally plausible yet inconsistent premises. It can also denote the state of
being perplexed, or at a loss—thinking itself helpless before a critical impasse. The notion
of an aporia is principally found in Greek philosophy, but it also plays a role in post-struc-
tural philosophy, as in the writings of Jacques Derrida and Luce Irigaray. See, e.g., Alan
Bass, Introduction to JACQUES DERRIDA, WRITING AND DIFFERENCE at xviii (Alan Bass trans.,
Routledge Classics 2d ed. 2001) (1980) (“Philosophy is founded on the principle of the
archia, on regulation by true, original principles; the deconstruction of philosophy reveals
the differential excess which makes the archia possible. This excess is often posed as an
aporia, the Greek word for a seemingly insoluble logical difficulty: once a system has been
‘shaken’ by following its totalizing logic to its final consequences, one finds an excess
which cannot be construed within the reasons of logic, for the excess can only be con-
ceived as neither this nor that, or both at the same time—a departure from all rules of
logic.”).
13. E.g., JOYCE J. GEORGE, JUDICIAL OPINION WRITING HANDBOOK 242 (4th ed. 2000)
(“[D]icta in opinions . . . [is] not encouraged.”). Technically, dicta is the plural of the
singular dictum. But to avoid dozens of grammatically correct but otherwise clunky “dicta
are” constructions, this Article will treat “dicta” as singular throughout, except where spe-
cifically noted.
14. See generally Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249 (2006).
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critics have dismissed dicta as mere rhetorical flourish, an indicia of
judicial vanity.15 Indeed, one might surmise from its many critics that
dicta is the worst of all possible utterances—an un-necessary evil,
whose very existence lacks any coherent justification.
Yet dicta persists. The admonition to eschew dicta is frequently
broken.16 Given the limits that case-or-controversy requirements place
on courts’ ability to make law in the abstract, this phenomenon ap-
pears troubling. For instance, “[c]onsiderations of judicial restraint
counsel that a federal court should not announce a rule broader than
necessary to decide the case before it.”17 This doctrine compels
minimalism: just facts and holdings, leaving no space for dicta.18 Any
excess language is no more than ad hoc speculation without prece-
dential value. From this perspective, dicta is trivial at best and poten-
tially hazardous at worst—the judicial equivalent of an attractive
nuisance. But moderation is a very dull, dreary affair. And judges ha-
bitually chance negligence, authoring and citing propositions that
bear little relation to holdings.19
What accounts for this strange pattern? Judicial obstinacy is an
unlikely explanation for this phenomenon. The decision-making free-
dom that judges have is a constrained freedom, subject to norms that
require impartiality, commitment to stability, and a due regard for the
demands of the judicial craft.20 As noted jurist Richard Posner ob-
serves, “[m]ost judges, like most serious artists, are trying to do a
‘good job,’ with what is ‘good’ being defined by the standards for the
‘art’ in question.”21 While there are no fixed, incontestable criteria of
judicial excellence, few judges are likely to risk their reputations by
cavalierly breaking the “rules” internal to the judicial game.22 Cer-
tainly, technical confusion regarding the distinction between holding
15. See Gerald Lebovits, Alifya V. Curtin & Lisa Solomon, Ethical Judicial Opinion Writ-
ing, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 237, 255 (2008) (“Dicta—often added to placate, or even
impress, the opinion’s audience—distracts the reader from the issues.”); Richard J. Neu-
haus, Rebuilding the Civic Public Square, 44 LOY. L. REV. 119, 125 (1998).
16. Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal
Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 662 (2001).
17. Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2005 (1994).
18. Id. at 2005–06.
19. Hathaway, supra note 16, at 662–63.
20. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 11–13, 125 (2008) [hereinafter POSNER,
HOW JUDGES THINK] (arguing that even judges with more or less complete freedom to
decide cases are constrained by concerns for their reputation among fellow members of
the bar “but even more by their having internalized the norms and usages of the judicial
‘game’”).
21. Id. at 12.
22. See id. at 125.
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and dicta is widespread.23 This might explain dicta’s presence in mar-
ginal instances, but not its exercise by the most egregious offenders.
In those cases, dicta clearly and powerfully exceeds the logic of any
purported holding.
Another explanation does better: perhaps previous commenta-
tors have been looking through the wrong end of the telescope. What
if the persistence of dicta is explained not as a gratuitous contingency,
but as a kind of necessity? The prevailing view of dicta contrasts its in-
significance with the importance of predictable legal rules. This view
neglects the inherent paradox of rules themselves (i.e., that following
the “rules” will sooner or later lead to distinctively unjust outcomes).
Can the persistence of dicta be explained by its necessity in securing
justice exactly where the law falls short? If so, then all these suspect
indulgences—the seemingly trivial aside, the ad hoc counsel, the slap-
dash digression—are conceivably more than what they appear.
Scholars have traditionally asked, “What is the distinction be-
tween dictum and holding?” And more recently, “How can the abuse
of dicta be curtailed?” These critics see a problem but are blind to
what gives rise to this vision. Consequently, the mystery vanishes
before our eyes. No one, it seems, has asked the right questions: Why
does dicta exist? And what is the meaning of this seemingly ineradica-
ble mischief?
This Article attempts to answer these questions. In what follows, I
criticize the conventional view of dicta and offer another in its place.
My point of entry into this investigation is an important, but little ob-
served, phenomenon: the use of dicta as equitable remedy. I explore
the mystery of dicta by giving a close reading of a handful of opinions,
each illuminating previously undisclosed aspects of this phenomenon.
Above all, the focus of this Article is the unique role that dicta plays as
a remedy for harms that seemingly have no legal prohibition. The
proposed account takes dicta seriously as a vehicle for the law’s subter-
ranean commitments. My goal is to explain not just how judges use
dicta, but why.
Part I of this Article explores the nature of equity. The focus is on
the inherent contradiction arising from the substantiation of justice
through a body of strict rules. Here, I argue that the conflict between
justice and law can best be understood as a form of equitable disso-
nance. In Part II, I suggest that dicta plays a crucial role in resolving
23. Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953,
957–59 (2005) (“While no satisfactory definition [of dicta] has yet to emerge, legal scholars
have largely turned their attention elsewhere.”).
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this conflict. This section sets out the theory of dicta as equitable rem-
edy, explaining dicta’s omnipresence in the law as a function of its
singular utility for expressing and resolving legal contradiction.
Part III applies this theory to a close reading of paradigmatic
cases in torts, contracts, and civil rights. This section elaborates the
theory of dicta as equitable remedy by demonstration of its three prin-
ciple features: (1) dicta as a form of punishment and symbolic remedy
through noncontrolling decisional language; (2) dicta as a source of
evolving legal standards in which the court announces a new rule
while refusing to apply it to the case at hand; and (3) dicta as a kind of
quasi-prophylactic remedy, whose reach extends beyond the immedi-
ate litigants.
Part IV addresses the criticism that dicta is an abuse of judicial
discretion by explaining dicta’s unique role in legal reasoning. Finally,
the Article concludes with an examination of the necessity of dicta
and explores what this phenomenon reveals about the deep structure
of the law.
Dicta is the most elusive of subjects: it conceals its nature even as
it discloses other essential truths. Like passage through a veritable hall
of mirrors, the study of dicta reveals previously unseen aspects of the
law. Lost in these reflections, most critics have neglected the mirror
itself. But understanding the significance of dicta requires a steady
gaze. Like the denizens of Plato’s cave, we must begin by learning to
see the truth of what is, not what appears to be.
I. Equity, Dissonance, and the Rule of Law
Judges have a narrow range of options when confronting legally
sanctioned injustice. Among their alternatives are resignation, dissent,
public protest, or silent acquiescence.24 One underappreciated strat-
egy is the use of dicta as moral indictment and prophylactic remedy.
But this strategy is best understood through dicta’s relationship to
other forms of equitable remedy generally.
Remedial issues arise whenever the law tells us that a plaintiff’s
rights have been infringed in a way that gives rise to a legal claim.25
This remedial authority is inherent in the judicial power extended to
courts, embodying the common law maxim of ubi jus, ibi remedium—
24. Jack B. Weinstein, Every Day Is a Good Day for a Judge to Lay Down His Professional Life
for Justice, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 131, 139–45 (2004).
25. DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES 25 (2d ed. 1993).
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where there is a right, there must be a remedy.26 When plaintiffs’
rights are infringed, a court sitting in equity has broad powers of dis-
cretion for shaping appropriate relief.27 However, that discretion is
not unlimited. A court’s decision to grant equitable relief must be sup-
ported by the facts and the law; that is, a judge may not impose condi-
tions or grant relief without regard to precedent and established
principles of equity jurisprudence.28 What’s more, “equity has no juris-
diction over imperfect obligations resting upon conscience or moral
duty only, unconnected with legal obligations.”29
The longstanding suspicion of equity in American law is under-
standable since Western legal systems emphasize justice according to
law rather than personal fiat.30 As Eric Zahnd observes, “A judge’s
[unrestrained] use of equity, if it were to entail ignoring established
legal principles in favor of . . . individualized case-by-case adjudication,
[w]ould destroy a system [grounded in] universally applicable
rules.”31 Consequently, judges often find themselves in the position of
enforcing laws they regard as unjust. Even where great harm has been
done, judges are typically powerless to provide a remedy for innocents
lacking corresponding legal rights, without overstepping their defined
role.
As we shall see, dicta offers judges a way out of this dilemma; it
provides a unique tool for addressing injustice, without doing injustice.
Dicta is thus essentially a manifestation of equity. But to suggest that
dicta is best understood as a form of equitable remedy should not be
confused with the claim that dicta is available only to courts sitting in
the exercise of traditional equity jurisdiction.32 That is far from the
26. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *109 (“[I]t is a settled and invariable
principle in the laws of England, that every right when with-held must have a remedy, and
every injury it’s proper redress.”); Jerry E. Norton, The Exclusionary Rule Reconsidered: Restor-
ing the Status Quo Ante, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 261, 262 (1998) (“The principle that for
every right there is a remedy—ubi jus, ibi remedium—was a rule at English Common Law
which the Supreme Court recognized as being central to American constitutional law be-
ginning with Marbury v. Madison.”).
27. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *114.
28. Claussen v. City of Lauderdale, 681 N.W.2d 722, 726 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004).
29. Linville v. Ripley, 173 S.W.2d 687, 690 (Mo. Ct. App. 1943).
30. Eric G. Zahnd, The Application of Universal Laws to Particular Cases: A Defense of Eq-
uity in Aristotelianism and Anglo-American Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1996, at 263,
264 (1996).
31. Id.; cf. Weinstein, supra note 24, at 140–45.
32. The authority exercised by courts sitting in equity jurisdiction has historically in-
cluded such powers as entering injunctions, enforcing titles to land, and settling bankrupt-
cies. See generally Richard H.W. Malloy, Expansive Equity Jurisprudence: A Court Divided, 40
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 641 (2007).
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case. Indeed, dicta is least necessary when a court enjoys broad discre-
tion to balance the interests of the litigants according to the exigen-
cies of the case. Rather, the description of dicta as a form of equitable
remedy must be understood metaphorically. It alludes to the power of
dicta to fashion remedies precisely where the law offers no other re-
course for a court faced with obvious injustice.
Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinion in Marbury v. Madison is
perhaps the most celebrated, while simultaneously notorious, exam-
ple of this strategy.33 That case arose from the Jefferson administra-
tion’s refusal to honor the undelivered judicial commissions of the
previous Congress. Seeking to avoid a direct confrontation with the
executive branch, Marshall analyzed the merits at length before de-
claring that the Court lacked jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus.
Jefferson was outraged that Marshall would publicly criticize him for
many pages in what amounted to obiter dicta preliminaries.34
The political and tactical genius of Marshall’s opinion was that it
separated legal questions from political ones while simultaneously
crafting a cogent argument for the exercise of judicial review.35 To-
day, the opinion is universally acknowledged as a constitutional
landmark for its pronouncement that “[i]t is emphatically the prov-
ince and the duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,”36
despite the absence of any explicit constitutional language granting
such power to the Court. As generations of first-year law students have
learned, Marshall and his Court may have lost the battle over Mar-
bury’s commission, but they won the war by advancing the principle of
judicial review.37
Marbury v. Madison is a classic example of the remedial power of
dicta. But this power is best appreciated as a manifestation of equity’s
33. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); see also David Coale & Wendy
Couture, Loud Rules, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 715, 738 (2007).
34. CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY, 1789–1835, at
244 (rev. ed. 1926) (noting that the dicta in Marbury “aroused severe criticism and attack by
President Jefferson and his adherents”); Paul E. McGreal, Ambition’s Playground, 68 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 1107, 1181 n.332 (2000).
35. Samuel R. Olken, The Ironies of Marbury v. Madison and John Marshall’s Judicial
Statesmanship, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 391, 434 (2004).
36. Id. at 391; see also Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
37. Robert J. Reinstein & Mark C. Rahdert, Reconstructing Marbury, 57 ARK. L. REV.
729, 771 (2005) (“The Marbury decision advances a series of propositions, all of which
Marshall claimed were demanded by the rule of law. The application of these principles
actually limited the potential scope of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction. That, of course,
was a small price for greatly expanding the ‘judicial power’ of constitutional review over
the President and Congress.”).
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traditional function as a mediation between the rule of law and the
demand for justice. Because I argue that dicta is a critical vehicle for
this mediation, understanding dicta as a form of equitable remedy re-
quires a familiarity with the roots of equity in the Western tradition.
A. The Historical and Philosophical Tradition of Equity in Anglo-
American Law
Equity has been said to be the principle by which justice may be
attained in cases where the prescribed or customary forms of law are
inadequate.38 For the ancients, the function of equity was to supple-
ment or correct the civil law.39 As Vernon Palmer points out, “Within
the English system, equity softened or abated the rigor of the com-
mon law through the Conscience of the Chancellor.”40
But equity has not been without its critics.41 Consider John Sel-
den’s notorious invective:
Equity is a rougish thing, for [in] law we have a measure [and]
know what to trust too. Equity is according to the conscience of
him that is Chancellor, and as that is larger or narrower so is eq-
uity. Tis . . . as if they should make the standard for the measure we
call a foot, to be the Chancellor’s foot; what an uncertain measure
this would be; one Chancellor has a long foot another a short foot
a third an indifferent foot; tis the same thing in the Chancellor’s
conscience.42
And equity—however great its past triumphs—continues to be as-
sailed by challenges to its legitimacy in the present.43
Equity has its roots in the legal theory of Aristotle.44 In Book V of
the Nicomachaen Ethics, Aristotle argues that, while all law is universal,
no rule can be formulated to cover every possible situation. There-
fore, “the law chooses the [universal rule] that is usually [correct],
well aware of the error being made.”45 That error is neither the fault
of the law nor the legislature, but lies instead with the nature of reality
38. 27 AM. JUR. 2D Equity § 1 (2008).
39. Zahnd, supra note 30, at 265–67.
40. Vernon V. Palmer, The Many Guises of Equity in a Mixed Jurisdiction: A Functional
View of Equity in Louisiana, 69 TUL. L. REV. 7, 8 (1994).
41. Zahnd, supra note 30, at 263–64.
42. JOHN SELDEN, THE TABLE TALK OF JOHN SELDEN 64 (William Pickering 1847)
(1689) (capitalization modernized).
43. See, e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, Foreword, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1993, at
1 (1993).
44. Joseph Hendel, Equity in the American Courts and in the World Court: Does the End
Justify the Means, 6 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 637, 638 (1996).
45. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 83 (Terence Irwin trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 2d
ed. 1999) (alterations in original).
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itself, which defies such general categorizations.46 Equity, on this the-
ory, is adaptive or corrective, rather than arbitrary or wholly creative—
a prudential doctrine, employing the hypothetical wisdom of the legis-
lator to correct deficiencies stemming from the law’s problematic
generality.47
The dominant modern interpretation of Aristotle’s theory is that
equity functions to fill gaps in the law. “[T]hat is,” as Zahnd com-
ments, “equity enables a judge to adjudicate correctly a case present-
ing a novel issue on which the legislature has enacted no law or that
law is incomplete.”48 This does not mean, however, that a judge sitting
in equity has unbridled discretion.49 Legal scholars have identified
two types of cases in which equity properly fills such gaps. The first is a
situation in which no enacted law covers the controversy at hand.
These are what modern theorists call “cases of first impression.” Such
cases present issues for which a judge has no relevant law or precedent
to apply.50
The second, more controversial, type of case addressed by equity
arises when the enacted law sweeps too broadly; while appearing to
apply, the law itself falls into error by dictating a different outcome
than what justice demands. Aristotle remarks that in these cases “what
happens violates the [intended scope of] the universal rule.”51 The
role of equity in this situation is to fill the gap between what is legal
and what is just.
The exercise of this second kind of Aristotelian equity is anath-
ema to the modern American legal system, grounded as it is in prece-
dent and the rule of law. Whereas in traditional English law, equitable
adjudication was informed by a desire “to do the right thing,” Ameri-
can courts are honor bound “to follow the rules.”52 This tradition valo-
rizes “objectivity and judicial duty over achievement of substantially
just results in the case at bar.”53 When confronted with a conflict be-
46. Id.
47. Zahnd, supra note 30, at 267.
48. Id. at 268.
49. See id.
50. Id. at 269.
51. ARISTOTLE, supra note 45, at 84.
52. John R. Kroger, Supreme Court Equity, 1789–1835, and the History of American Judg-
ing, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 1425, 1455 (1998) (“In traditional equity, and for the pre–Marshall
Court, equitable adjudication was informed by the desire to do the right thing: to decide a
case according to ‘justice and honor,’ so that the rights of the party with the ‘highest
equity’ were vindicated. This goal disappears from early Marshall Court equity. Instead of
seeking justice, the Court sought to apply the rules.”).
53. Id.
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tween law and right, American judges are counseled, in essence, to
sacrifice the interests of justice on the altar of consistency.
This conflict exposes a significant paradox. That judges must
obey the law is axiomatic, but this obligation inevitably frustrates the
legal system’s underlying purpose (i.e., doing justice). This is the law’s
equivalent of a Catch-22. The judge’s responsibility with regards to
this paradox is unclear. Indeed, judges appear stranded between
Scylla and Charybdis—the prisoner of equally binding, yet inconsis-
tent, demands.
In actual practice, of course, the law survives this contradiction.
The demand that courts enforce even those laws that render unjust
results does not result in the breakdown or immobilization of the le-
gal system. We therefore need an account that preserves the distinc-
tion between equity and law but that depicts their relationship more
accurately than the prevailing view. I now propose such an alternative
account.
B. The Model of Equitable Dissonance
Mozart’s wife famously struck an unresolved piano chord to rouse
the composer from bed in the morning.54 A half-finished melody was
a torment for the composer, like a fly buzzing inside his ear. Only by
resolving the chord progression to its tonic, the “home base” of the
entire sequence, could Mozart restore harmonic order and quell the
dissonant cacophony ringing in his head.55
Music, however, is not the only realm in which dissonance and
consonance play key roles. The starting point of Charles Sanders
Peirce’s pragmatism, for instance, is “the idea that people hate being
in a state of doubt and will do whatever is necessary to move from
doubt to belief.”56 This is as true of judges as of anyone else,57 and the
model I intend to sketch regarding the interaction of justice and the
law is best illustrated by an analogous set of concepts.
Any complex system of thought inevitably gives rise to contradic-
tion. Within the system this phenomenon is experienced as disso-
nance—the uncomfortable sensation of simultaneously holding two
54. Opera Background: The Twelve-Tone System, METROPOLITAN OPERA: INT’L RADIO
BROADCAST INFO. CENTER, http://archive.operainfo.org/broadcast/operaBackground.cgi?
id=85&language=1 (last visited Mar. 24, 2012).
55. Id.
56. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 192 (1990) [hereinafter
POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE].
57. Id.
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contradictory ideas.58 Social psychology teaches that when individuals
experience “cognitive” dissonance, they have a strong motivational
drive to reduce this uncomfortable sensation by changing or rational-
izing their attitudes, thoughts, or behaviors.59 Dissonance occurs
when a person perceives a logical inconsistency among his or her be-
liefs. This happens, for instance, when one belief entails the contra-
diction of another.60 For example, a belief in the importance of good
health could be interpreted as inconsistent with smoking cigarettes or
overeating. Noticing this contradiction leads to dissonance, which can
be experienced as guilt, shame, anxiety, anger, stress, and other nega-
tive emotional states.61 By contrast, when people’s ideas are consistent
with each other, they are in a state of harmony or consonance. As Leon
Festinger first proposed, “The existence of dissonance, being psycho-
logically uncomfortable, will motivate a person to try to reduce disso-
nance and achieve consonance.”62 Indeed, a failure to reduce
dissonance, in extreme cases, can result in mental illness, breakdown,
or even death.63
This dynamic exists within systems as well as people. When an
intellectual system’s flaws give rise to significant contradiction, either
the system must be abandoned or the contradiction must be re-
solved.64 The challenge confronting the system is how to preserve its
fundamental principles while resolving this dissonance.
The process by which a contradiction between two conflicting in-
sights is resolved in a synthesis that incorporates the truth-value of
both is commonly described as a dialectic. This concept is best under-
stood in terms of one of its key principles: sublation, an English term
58. See 5 MARIO AUGUSTO BUNGE, TREATISE ON BASIC PHILOSOPHY 200–01 (1983);
GREGG HENRIQUES, A NEW UNIFIED THEORY OF PSYCHOLOGY 133–35 (2011).
59. LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 2–3 (Stanford Univ. Press
1962) (proposing that individuals are strongly motivated to reduce psychological discom-
fort caused by the recognition of inconsistencies within their own belief systems).
60. Id.
61. ELIZA AHMED, NATHAN HARRIS, JOHN BRAITHWAITE & VALERIE BRAITHWAITE, SHAME
MANAGEMENT THROUGH REINTEGRATION 187 (2001).
62. FESTINGER, supra note 59, at 3.
63. See generally R.D. HINSHELWOOD, SUFFERING INSANITY: PSYCHOANALYTIC ESSAYS ON
PSYCHOSIS 76–77 (2004); JOHN H. RIKER, HUMAN EXCELLENCE AND AN ECOLOGICAL CONCEP-
TION OF THE PSYCHE 82 (1991); see also Peter S. Bearman, The Social Structure of Suicide, 6
SOC. F. 501, 512–16 (1991) (discussing Durkheim’s theory of the relationship between
social anomie and suicide).
64. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 77–79 (2d ed. 1970)
(arguing that the transition to alternate scientific paradigms—necessitating the abandon-
ment of existing systems of thought—occurs whenever an intellectual crisis is so severe that
the logic internal to the existing dominant system can no longer provide answers).
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used to translate the German word, aufhebung.65 Aufhebung has the ap-
parently contradictory implications of both preserving and changing
its object (the German verb aufheben means “to cancel,” “retain,” and
“raise up”).66 In a genuinely dialectical process, sublation is the vehi-
cle by which a lower conceptual stage “is both annulled and preserved
in a higher one.”67
As in a Socratic dialogue, the dialectical process functions by
making implicit contradictions explicit.68 Consider Marx’s favorite ex-
ample, democratic capitalism. Marx argued that consolidation of pro-
duction in the hands of a few capitalists led to crises of
overproduction where the resulting slump in sales forced businesses
to suspend operations and condemn millions of their laid-off workers
to stark poverty, precisely because of the relative abundance of
goods.69 Marx thought that the very essence of the capitalist system—
its tendency to extend production without limits in the pursuit of
profit—reflected a fundamental contradiction that would lead to its
destruction.70 The insight of genuinely dialectical thinking is that the
contradictions that emerge do not arise from a clash of competing
interests or principles; rather, they are in and internal to systems.71
The law is one such system. The foundation of law is justice, but
justice is an abstraction. While its pursuit explains much judicial be-
havior, the concept of justice provides little concrete guidance. Justice
is like a country with few discernable borders and no reliable maps.
We discover the contours of justice one case at a time, as an explorer
might chart rivers in a vast wilderness. But the application of that un-
derstanding in the form of strict legal rules produces frustration. No
particular rule can ever substantiate a universal concept like justice.
65. STEPHEN DAVID ROSS, METAPHYSICAL APORIA AND PHILOSOPHICAL HERESY 253
(1989) (noting that to supersede through sublation “is at once to negate and to preserve”).
66. QUENTIN LAUER, ESSAYS IN HEGELIAN DIALECTIC 105 (1977).
67. See ANDREW HUSSEY, THE INNER SCAR: THE MYSTICISM OF GEORGES BATAILLE 12
(2000) (describing Hegel’s concept of sublation as the “dialectical transition in which a
lower stage is both annulled and preserved in a higher one”).
68. MICHAEL N. FORSTER, HEGEL AND SKEPTICISM 172 (1989).
69. ERNEST MANDEL, AN INTRODUCTION TO MARXIST ECONOMIC THEORY 47, 65–67 (2d
ed. 1973); see also BERTELL OLLMAN, DANCE OF THE DIALECTIC: STEPS IN MARX’S METHOD
162–65 (2003).
70. OLLMAN, supra note 69, at 164–65.
71. Traditionally, the dialectical process has been explained in terms of the categories
of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. This model is associated with Hegel’s The Science of Logic
but does not capture the intricate nature of Hegelian dialectic, which emphasizes the fun-
damental contradictions inherent within systems of thought. The familiar model is actually
derived from the work of Hegel’s contemporary, Johann Gottlieb Fichte. See generally 7
FREDERICK COPLESTON, A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY (1965).
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The inherent deficiency of legal rules thus inevitably gives rise to con-
tradictory outcomes.
Consider Blackstone’s famous observation that the law of
Bologna “that whoever drew blood in the streets should be punished
with the utmost severity” should not be interpreted to make punisha-
ble a surgeon “who opened the vein of a person that fell down in the
street with a fit.”72 As this example makes clear, sometimes the pur-
pose of a law can be achieved only by ignoring its command. Even in
simple cases, however, this paradoxical duty can lead judges astray.
Judge Posner notes the struggles of a French court that, had it obeyed
the emphatic French commitment to formal legalism, would have
been compelled to read literally a statute which nonsensically forbade
train passengers to get on or off the train when it was not moving.73
More complicated cases often result in outright error.
In Olmstead v. United States, for instance, the Supreme Court ruled
that the natural reading of the Fourth Amendment protected one’s
person, home, papers, and effects from being searched but not one’s
private speech.74 Wiretapped phone conservations, obtained by the
government without a warrant and subsequently used as evidence,
were held constitutional. This decision remained on the books for
forty years until it was reversed by Katz v. United States in 1967—a deci-
sion which itself largely relied upon the logic of the dissenting opin-
ion (i.e., the dicta) of Justice Brandeis from the original Olmstead
case.75
Likewise, a defendant who commits a novel or unanticipated
harm against innocent victims creates a paradox for the legal system.
In this scenario, where an obvious harm has been done to an innocent
victim, the defendant is simultaneously guilty and not guilty: guilty of
doing an injustice, but at the same time not guilty of violating any of
the laws enacted to prevent such crimes. This contradiction is prob-
lematic. In extreme cases, it calls the entire legal system into question,
72. BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *60.
73. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK, supra note 20, at 199.
74. 277 U.S. 438 (1928); see also POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK, supra note 20, at 200–01.
75. 389 U.S. 347, 350–54 (1967). Many scholars see Brandeis’ dissent not only as the
origin of communications privacy but also as the foundation of modern Fourth Amend-
ment privacy law. See, e.g., William C. Heffernan, Privacy Rights, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 737,
772 (1995) (“[T]he origin of modern constitutional privacy law is to be found in a passage
Justice Louis Brandeis included in his 1928 dissent in Olmstead v. United States . . . .”); Orin
S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Cau-
tion, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 804 (2004) (noting that Brandeis’ dissent “provides the guid-
ing light” for proponents of the view that the Fourth Amendment should be interpreted
broadly as communications technology advances).
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begging a more adequate resolution.76 Accordingly, the question
arises: How does the legal system evolve, rather than collapse, under
the weight of such contradiction?
To answer this question, we must return to our starting point:
dissonance. What is the device within a binding legal opinion that al-
lows a judge both to express dissonance but then to resolve that disso-
nance, like a complex symphonic movement, within a higher and
more complete consonance? It would have to be a rhetorical device
that simultaneously contradicts the logic of the holding, while cre-
atively transforming that contradiction into something more than the
sum of self-negating propositions. It would be something “trivial,” yet
undoubtedly “significant,” a “throwaway” that proved itself “neces-
sary.” In other words, it would be a device that embodies all the seem-
ingly paradoxical qualities of a concept we have already explored—
dicta.77
II. Dicta as Equitable Remedy
Dicta, like vice, takes many forms.78 Obiter dictum is roughly
translated from the Latin as a statement made “by the way.”79 The
legal definition of dicta is a remark or observation made by a judge
76. The infamous first Rodney King trial and the riots that followed provide one such
example. See Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Speech to the 1992 Convention of the Washington,
D.C. Bar Association (June 25, 1992), in 34 B.C. L. REV. 1, 5 (1992) (“[The] justice system
. . . has been called into question in the aftermath of the Rodney King verdict.”).
77. The comparison of dicta to musical dissonance in this context is illuminating.
Musical dissonance creates feelings of instability, tension, and conflict. We experience a
sense of aural relief when dissonant tones logically progress to consonant tones. Compos-
ers compare this reharmonization of conflicting strains of melody to a sense of “coming
home.” See, e.g., IGOR STRAVINSKY, POETICS OF MUSIC 34 (Arthur Knodel & Ingolf Dahl
trans., Vintage Books 1947) (1942) (“[D]isonance is an element of transition, a complex or
interval of tones which is not complete in itself and which must be resolved to the ear’s
satisfaction into a perfect consonance.”).
78. Legal scholars have traditionally attributed a variety of uses to dicta, including: (1)
a limiting device used by courts to narrow the perceived breadth of a holding to avoid
future overexpansion, (2) nonbinding comments provided as a predictive guide to courts
and litigators regarding future rulings in related cases, (3) nonbinding guidance offered
by appellate courts to lower courts regarding reoccurring procedural problems, and (4) a
harmless outlet for the frustrated philosophical and literary pretensions of certain particu-
larly loquacious judges. See, e.g., Leval, supra note 14, at 1253–56 & n.17 (commenting that
dicta can serve valuable purposes despite the tendency of courts to abuse it by engaging in
“flawed, ill-considered judgment”). These forms of dicta are generally considered valid by
courts and scholars and are not substantially addressed within the context of the current
Article. Rather, in discussing dicta, my goal is to shed light on the previously little noticed
use of dicta as remedy and the role it plays in expressing and resolving equitable dissonance
within the law.
79. See RUPERT CROSS & J.W. HARRIS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW 41 (4th ed. 1991).
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that, although included in the body of the opinion, does not form a
necessary part of the court’s decision.80 But like gossip, these remarks
take on a life of their own. Trying to silence dicta is like trying to
unring a bell.
Every case presents questions of fact and law. At the appellate
level, these questions are raised in the briefs, like a series of exam
problems for the court. The holding of an opinion provides answers
to these questions. However, when deciding cases, courts do not al-
ways limit themselves to the questions raised by the litigants. We find
marginalia scattered throughout opinions: hypotheticals, conjectures,
and observations of all kinds. These remarks are the judicial
equivalent of formulas scratched in the margins of exam blue books—
not so much answers, but more a part of the process of arriving at
answers. Technically, these remarks do not count towards a court’s
final grade. Courts may be criticized for such observations, but they
cannot be reversed.81 This is because, as a matter of law, any statement
made in excess of the specific controversy before the court is not bind-
ing.82 These statements are the stuff of dicta.
Judge Pierre Leval has described dicta as “an assertion in a court’s
opinion of a proposition of law which does not explain why the court’s
judgment goes in favor of the winner.”83 If the court’s judgment
would remain unchanged, regardless of the proposition in question,
then that proposition is dicta—it plays no role in explaining the direct
outcome of the case.84 In an opinion, obiter dicta include, but are not
limited to, words introduced “by way of illustration, analogy, or argu-
ment.”85 Unlike rationes decidendi, obiter dicta are not considered part
of a case’s holding, even if they happen to be correct statements of the
law. For instance, once a court determines that a statute does not ap-
ply to a case, any statement concerning that statute’s constitutionality
is dictum.86 Similarly, the arguments and reasoning of dissenting
opinions also constitute dicta.87
80. 21 C.J.S. Courts § 227 (2008).
81. Leval, supra note 14, at 1262 (“No appeal may be taken from the assertion of an
erroneous legal rule in dictum.”).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1256–57.
84. Id. at 1256.
85. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1100 (7th ed. 1999) (quoting WILLIAM M. LILE ET AL.,
BRIEF MAKING AND THE USE OF LAW BOOKS 304 (3d ed. 1914)).
86. Avants v. Kennedy, 752 So. 2d 150, 151 (La. 2000).
87. See, e.g., Singleton v. Comm’r, 439 U.S. 940, 944–45 (1978) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring) (describing dissents from denial of certiorari as “totally unnecessary” and “the purest
form of dicta”).
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The distinction between dictum and holding is best understood
as the product of the common law’s reliance on precedent. This dis-
tinction becomes necessary as judges and commentators attempt to
elicit rules from prior decisions. The holding is whatever has prece-
dential value for future courts. (This is why dissenting opinions have
traditionally been considered all dicta.) The dictum is whatever is left
over (i.e., the excess). Consequently, many critics argue that dicta
should be disposed of entirely.88 For these strict legalists, dicta is like
the horror movie monster that just won’t die.
While statements constituting dicta are not binding on future
courts, they can be persuasive.89 In drafting opinions, judges routinely
quote passages of obiter dicta found in prior cases to reach a legal
conclusion. Typically, such quotations are made without even an ac-
knowledgement of the passage’s status as dicta. In this manner, dicta
often becomes part of the holding in subsequent cases, depending
upon what the latter court decided and how the principle embodied
in the quoted passage was treated.90
The power of well-crafted dicta to influence future outcomes is
illustrated by allusion to the better-known practice of judicial dissent.
In the course of American legal history, several dissenting opinions
have succeeded in changing the law, either by persuading Congress to
enact new legislation or by persuading a new court majority.91 Among
the most famous, and certainly the most dramatic, was Justice Storey’s
dissent in Cary v. Curtis, which became law only thirty-six days after its
publication, upon passage of congressional legislation regarding the
collection of customs duties.92 Other dissents, like Justice Harlan’s im-
passioned rejection of the separate but equal doctrine in Plessy v. Fer-
guson, were forced to await redemption by a future generation.93
These cases are examples of dissent as earnest, principled, and elo-
quent. But this process of transforming dissent into positive law ap-
plies as equally to dicta as to its more heroic judicial cousin.
88. See, e.g., Leval, supra note 14.
89. See McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130, 141–42 (1981).
90. Hathaway, supra note 16, at 662 (describing lawmaking by dicta as a pernicious
phenomenon that judges should stamp out).
91. Laura Krugman Ray, Justice Brennan and the Jurisprudence of Dissent, 61 TEMP. L.
REV. 307, 310 (1988).
92. Id.; Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 252 (1845) (Story, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that executive functionaries cannot have power to determine constitutional limit of the
Act).
93. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing
in dissent that the Constitution does not condone separate but equal facilities).
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Dicta is a particularly subtle weapon in the hands of judges con-
fronting legally sanctioned injustice. Although rarely acknowledged,
the use of dicta as a form of equitable remedy appears in the margins
of many important opinions. For example, it is well known that courts
often employ dicta to comment directly on policies they regard as
foolish or unethical. Less observed, however, is the use of dicta to es-
tablish remedies for injuries that might otherwise go uncorrected.
Consider, for example, dicta’s utility to courts engaged in pro-
spective overruling.94 It has often been recognized that, when persons
have acted in reliance on a subsequently overruled decision, such reli-
ance should receive protection, even at the expense of plaintiffs with
an otherwise just claim.95 When a court desires to overrule an earlier
case or announce a significantly different standard, it may conclude
that justifiable reliance on the court’s earlier decisions has been so
great that any decision overruling precedent must operate prospec-
tively only. In such circumstances, the court may hold that the parties
before it are bound by the earlier case’s rule. But the court may also,
by means of dictum, indicate its disapproval of the earlier decision
and suggest that any subsequent reliance on that rule henceforth will
be considered unjustified.96
In this manner, dicta serves as both warning and prophecy. By
employing dicta to announce a prospective new rule, the court ad-
vances the interests of justice while reconciling tensions in legal doc-
trine. But what’s more, this act allows a judge to avoid many of the
problems associated with prospective overruling. On the one hand,
the court sidesteps the injustice that would follow from the new rule’s
94. See Beryl Harold Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 7–25 (1960) (discussing the history of the origin and development of the idea of
prospective overruling); see generally BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 147–49 (1921); Roger J. Traynor, Quo Vadis, Prospective Overruling: A Question of
Judicial Responsibility, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 533 (1977).
95. See, e.g., Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 235 F. Supp. 526, 536–38 (S.D.N.Y.
1964) (finding the retroactive application of a Supreme Court decision overruling a prior
doctrine to be “manifestly unjust”).
96. There are in fact at least three types of prospective overruling. See Walter V. Schae-
fer, The Control of “Sunbursts”: Techniques of Prospective Overruling, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 631, 646
(1967) (discussing types of prospective overruling advocating careful development of tech-
nique). First, in an instance of purely prospective overruling, the newly announced rule
will not apply to the litigants at bar or to any event occurring before the effective date of
the decision. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639–40 (1965). Second, the court may
announce that the new rule will not take effect until some future date. See Molitor v. Kane-
land Cmty. Unit Dist. No. 302, 163 N.E.2d 89, 97–98 (Ill. 1959). Finally, the court may
overrule prospectively but apply the old rule to the litigants at bar. See United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 242 (1967).
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immediate application to those justifiably relying on precedent. But
on the other hand, employing dicta allows courts to avoid the injustice
associated with providing the benefit of a new rule only to the plaintiff
at the bar while denying relief to all similarly situated plaintiffs. By
providing a remedy in the form of dicta, the court advances all of its
equitable goals simultaneously: rectification, the preservation of doc-
trinal stability, and the transformation of outworn rules into standards
capable of achieving real justice.
So too, the use of dicta as remedy resembles another familiar
practice: the prophylactic injunction. Like other equitable remedies,
injunctions aim at preventing harm. In the case of a typical injunc-
tion, the court must decide whether the facts reveal a probable threat,
because injunctive relief is available only in the face of an imminent,
irreparable injury.97 Before granting such relief, however, the court
must consider the competing interests of both plaintiffs and defend-
ants. Prophylactic injunctions follow a similar logic, but typically reach
much further into the social landscape. Brian Landsberg describes a
prophylactic injunction as “one issued because of ‘risk of a future vio-
lation’ but forbidding ‘conduct that is not itself a violation of
anything.’”98
Prophylactic remedies are fundamentally oriented towards the fu-
ture. Legal scholar, David Luban, refers to this kind of “ex ante” rem-
edy as an “activist” remedy—one which seeks to secure rights by
forestalling future violations, rather than merely punishing offenses.99
By imposing a prophylactic injunction, the court lays down a code of
conduct designed to prevent such injuries from occurring in the first
place.100 “These measures,” Tracy Thomas insists, “convert previously
legal conduct into prohibited conduct by virtue of the injunctive rem-
edy backed by the court’s contempt power.”101 Not only is unlawful
behavior prohibited, but positive duties are often created and im-
97. Brian K. Landsberg, Safeguarding Constitutional Rights: The Uses and Limits of Prophy-
lactic Rules, 66 TENN. L. REV. 925, 960–61 (1998–1999); see also Douglas Laycock, The Death
of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687, 702 (1990).
98. Landsberg, supra note 97, at 960–61 (quoting DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERI-
CAN REMEDIES 272 (2d ed. 1994).
99. David Luban, The Warren Court and the Concept of a Right, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
7, 11–13 (1999). Further, “[a] court order to a legislature to budget funds for a new prison
in order to remedy Eighth Amendment violations is ex ante, because it aims to prevent
future violations rather than compensating or punishing past ones.” Id. at 11.
100. See generally Tracy A. Thomas, Understanding Prophylactic Remedies Through the Look-
ing Glass of Bush v. Gore, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 343, 351 (2002) [hereinafter Thomas,
Understanding Prophylactic Remedies].
101. Id. at 352.
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posed on defendants and innocent third-parties alike.102 Thus, the
consequence of prophylactic remedies is a reordering of structural re-
lations among a wide variety of institutional actors—many often at a
great distance from the scene of the original crime.103
A classic example of this kind of prophylactic remedy is the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona.104 By requiring Miranda
warnings, the Court sought to reduce in advance the likelihood of
coerced confessions, bullied suspects, and grueling interrogations
outside the presence of an attorney.105 The goal, in short, was not
mitigating such harms but preventing them in the first place. This ex
ante approach is the hallmark of the prophylactic strategy. As we shall
see, courts routinely employ dicta in analogous fashion in an effort to
curb wrongs before they can occur.
In short, dicta possesses a multifaceted capacity to provide relief
from legally sanctioned injustice. First, dicta provides courts with the
ability to comment directly on behavior that might otherwise escape
public notice. Like the opinion in Marbury, this provides courts with a
powerful opportunity to heap scorn upon conduct which they find
“legal” but morally contemptible. Such opprobrium acts as both pun-
ishment and symbolic acknowledgment of wrongdoing, a last ditch al-
ternative when no other remedies present themselves.
Second, dicta allows courts to evolve new standards against which
subsequent offenders’ conduct can be judged. While unable to punish
directly those who have infringed a plaintiff’s extra-legal rights, courts
may nevertheless provide guidance to future courts and legislators by
articulating wrongs and ruminating on proper legal standards.106
What passes as dicta the first time may well confront a defendant as
law in subsequent lawsuits.
102. Id.
103. See Tracy A. Thomas, The Prophylactic Remedy: Normative Principles and Definitional
Parameters of Broad Injunctive Relief, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 301, 314–22 (2004) [hereinafter
Thomas, The Prophylactic Remedy].
104. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that statements obtained from defendants during
police interrogations, without a full warning of constitutional rights, were inadmissible as
having been obtained in violation of Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination).
105. Luban, supra note 99, at 12.
106. See Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior
Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 75 (1994) (“[L]ower courts frequently give consid-
erable, and sometimes even dispositive, weight to nonbinding but well-considered dicta
when addressing novel legal questions. Given such dicta’s probative value in predicting
future higher court behavior, in effect this practice maximizes the probability of corre-
spondence between lower and higher court decisions. Thus, reliance on dicta acts as a
partial proxy, as it were, for employing the predictive model forthrightly.”).
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Third, such public shaming acts not only as a form of corrective
punishment but as a deterrent against future harms. Potential
tortfeasors are warned that their behavior will be subject to similar
scrutiny and ridicule if they cross the line drawn by the court in the
dicta of its opinion. This is a serious threat because, as we shall see in
our examination of In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation,107 such
reputational damages can be far more costly than money damages.108
In short, dicta’s potential as a source of punitive damages and prophy-
lactic remedies is a powerful weapon in the court’s judicial arsenal.
There are at least three distinct features, then, of the use of dicta
as an equitable remedy: (1) the punishment of bad actors through
noncontrolling decisional language; (2) the evolution of legal stan-
dards; and (3) the imposition of quasi-prophylactic remedies which,
while not legally binding, cut more broadly than a defendant’s alleged
wrongs.109
The tripartite structure of dicta as remedy reflects its temporal
horizons: past, present, and future. In this, it mirrors the process of
judicial reflection. The resolution of a lawsuit confronts the judge
along multiple temporal dimensions: the harm arising from prior
events, the immediate demand for rectification, and the future conse-
quences following from any decision. When crafting an opinion, the
judge must deal in all three dimensions at once.
The employment of dicta as remedy exhibits this same temporal
structure: dicta as punishment corresponds with the past; dicta as
source of new rules adapted to social need corresponds with the pre-
sent; dicta as prophylactic remedy corresponds with the future. Rather
107. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney IV), 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005).
108. See infra Part III.C (discussing the Disney litigation in depth).
109. It is important to distinguish what I mean by a “quasi-prophylactic remedy” from
prophylactic remedies generally. The term “prophylactic remedy” derives from the Su-
preme Court’s label for a specific type of injunctive relief, used both descriptively and
pejoratively by the Justices. As defined by Tracy Thomas, there are three definitive attrib-
utes of a prophylactic remedy: it is “(1) injunctive relief with a preventive goal, (2) that
imposes specific measures reaching affiliated legal conduct that contributes to the primary
harm,” (3) enforced by the court’s contempt power. Thomas, The Prophylactic Remedy, supra
note 103, at 312–15. Dicta as a “quasi-prophylactic remedy” lacks certain of these character-
istics. Most obviously, dicta as a quasi-prophylactic remedy is not supported by threat of
contempt. But there are vital similarities. Most critically, dicta is “prophylactic” because it
aims to prevent future harms, rather than simply rectify past injuries. And dicta, like pro-
phylactic injunctions, can function to constrain not just the actions of “guilty” parties, but
often has significant effects on a variety of “innocent actors”—prison guards, school admin-
istrators, office managers, etc.—who are forced to transform existing practices to avoid
potential liability. The nature of dicta as quasi-prophylactic remedy is explored more fully
below.
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than being synonymous with ad hoc adjudication, in the sense of only
having regard for the immediate consequences to the parties, dicta is
a manifestation of equity, a tool enabling the court to consider mat-
ters systematically, including the long-term institutional consequences
of injustice. As James Booth insists, justice is in one of its key dimen-
sions the memory of evil past: “Memory seizes the crime, keeps it
among the unforgotten, and insists on retribution.”110 But if dicta is
the voice of equity, this memory work is also a testament, because the
remembrance of the past carries with it the promise of a future
redemption.
If this hypothesis is correct, then dicta plays a crucial role in the
model of equitable dissonance. Dicta does not emerge contingently as
an exercise of arbitrary judicial discretion, but necessarily as a mani-
festation of contradiction within the law. Like the better known prac-
tice of judicial dissent, dicta is a rhetorical device that not only allows
a judge to speak out against legally sanctioned injustice, but also al-
lows her to resolve equitable dissonance in a higher and more perfect
consonance. This transformative moment—the moment of subla-
tion—occurs when a judge uses dicta as remedy to articulate a supe-
rior legal standard. This is a standard that both preserves the law while
transcending its contradictions.
III. The Equitable Complex Writ Large
The pattern of legal contradiction giving rise to injustice runs
deep in the law. Because this pattern is so persistent, equitable disso-
nance abounds in the legal landscape. Likewise, the use of dicta as
remedy is not an exceptional phenomenon. As we shall see, courts
have employed dicta to resolve seemingly intractable conflicts in areas
of law as diverse as torts, property, contracts, and civil rights.
On the basis of the foregoing discussion, the following hypothesis
may now be proposed: We may expect judges to utilize dicta (1) as a
response to lawfully sanctioned injustice; such that (2) a legal contra-
diction is exposed; and (3) an equitable remedy is provided when an
innocent plaintiff has suffered harm for which no other form of rem-
edy exists. In what follows, I undertake to illustrate this hypothesis by
examining a series of decisions across a broad range of doctrinal cate-
gories. My aim is inductive, not synthetic. Instead of collecting cases to
110. W. James Booth, The Unforgotten: Memories of Justice, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 777, 779
(2001); see also Norman W. Spaulding, Constitution as Countermonument: Federalism, Recon-
struction, and the Problem of Collective Memory, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1992, 1999 (2003) (arguing
that courts are “mnemonic institutions par excellence”).
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prove my points, my method is to choose a small number of opinions
for investigation—opinions that display what I take to be the essen-
tially dialectical nature of equitable adjudication. More precisely, I
contend that the appearance of dicta in these cases is best understood
as a manifestation of equitable dissonance: a process through which
legal contradiction is simultaneously acknowledged and transcended.
A. The Judge as Magician: The Evolution of Legal Doctrine in
Beatty v. Guggenheim
Equity cases are rich in examples of the dynamic synthesis of jus-
tice and law.111 Among the outstanding practitioners of equity in the
twentieth century, none surpassed the achievement of Justice Benja-
min Cardozo in showing how the common law could be adapted to
serve society’s needs.112 His project of bringing law into phase with
ordinary moral practices and expectations is epitomized by Beatty v.
Guggenheim Exploration Co.113 Perhaps the seminal case in the history
of American constructive trust doctrine, Beatty illustrates the conflict
between ossified legal doctrine and broad equitable concerns from
which the necessity of dicta arises.
Beatty confronted New York’s Court of Appeals with a classic ex-
ample of the so-called “faithless fiduciary.” The Guggenheim Com-
pany employed an agent, Robert Beatty, to investigate and acquire
desirable mining claims; the agent subsequently acquired a series of
competing claims for himself, ultimately realizing a large profit, likely
at the expense of his employers.114 Despite the existence of a contract
specifically forbidding him from engaging in speculation, Beatty nev-
ertheless pursued his own interests while working for Guggenheim in
Alaska. The issue before the court was “whether the plaintiff ever ‘law-
fully’ acquired a right to the profits at issue.”115
111. RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 105 (1990) [hereinafter
POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION].
112. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A BOOK OF LEGAL LISTS 23 (1997); Bernard Schwartz, The
Judicial Ten: America’s Greatest Judges, 1979 S. ILL. U. L.J. 405, 424–28; see generally Bernard
Weissman, Cardozo: “All Time Greatest” American Judge, 19 CUMB. L. REV. 1 (1988).
113. Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co. (Beatty II), 122 N.E. 378 (N.Y. 1919).
114. This was the second time this case had come before the New York Court of Ap-
peals. For a fuller description of the facts, see Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co. (Beatty
I), 119 N.E. 575, 576–77 (N.Y. 1918); see also Kenneth E. Burdon, Note, Accounting for Profits
in a Copyright Infringement Action: A Restitutionary Perspective, 87 B.U. L. REV. 255, 280
n.157 (2007) (commenting that this case presented “a common fact pattern in
restitution”).
115. H. Jefferson Powell, “Cardozo’s Foot”: The Chancellor’s Conscience and Constructive
Trusts, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1993, at 7, 25 (quoting Beatty II, 122 N.E. 378).
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At Beatty’s core was a controversial legal issue: the propriety of
exercising constructive trust doctrine as a remedy for plaintiffs’
losses.116 The doctrine is an exercise in legal fiction: when a court
decides that a defendant may not in good conscience retain an unjust
gain, it first declares her to be a “constructive trustee,” then orders her
to make a transfer of money or property to the “beneficiary” of the
newly created trust—the plaintiff.117 Today, the constructive trust doc-
trine is perhaps the most common form of equitable remedy in the
United States.118 But this doctrine’s triumph was not a matter of his-
torical or logical necessity.119
The constructive trust doctrine has long been rejected by English
courts, which cling to the traditional view that a trust is proper only
where there has been some prior confidential or fiduciary relation-
ship between the parties.120 Liability in restitution was historically re-
garded as an equitable claim.121 But the traditional understanding of
the constructive trust significantly curtailed the scope within which a
court could exercise its discretion. A court’s focus under this ap-
proach was on the presence or absence of evidence showing the exis-
tence of a quasi-fiduciary relationship and its abuse—not on the
substantive equities between plaintiff and defendant.122
Like their English counterparts, American courts historically were
unwilling to transform the constructive trust from a substantive legal
116. See Roscoe Pound, The Progress of the Law, 1918–1919: Equity, 33 HARV. L. REV. 420,
420–21 (1920).
117. Mark A. Thurmon, Ending the Seventh Amendment Confusion: A Critical Analysis of the
Right to a Jury Trial in Trademark Cases, 11 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 40 (2002); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 55(3) cmt. a (2011)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)] (“A constructive trust is the formula through which
the conscience of equity finds expression. When property has been acquired in such cir-
cumstances that the holder of the legal title may not in good conscience retain the benefi-
cial interest, equity converts him into a trustee.” (quoting Beatty II, 122 N.E. at 380)).
118. See Thurmon, supra note 117, at 40. American constructive trust doctrine is notori-
ously confusing and unwieldy. The most nuanced discussions of American constructive
trust law can be found in HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION 74–80
(2004); Andrew Kull, Restitution in Bankruptcy: Reclamation and Constructive Trust, 72 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 265 (1998); Emily L. Sherwin, Constructive Trusts in Bankruptcy, 1989 U. ILL. L.
REV. 297, 313–29.
119. See Powell, supra note 115, at 15. Even Pound reluctantly acknowledged that many
U.S. courts had rejected this liberal interpretation of the constructive trust doctrine. See id.
at 13.
120. See Chaim Saiman, Restitution and the Production of Legal Doctrine, 65 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 993, 1024–25 (2008) (“Because English trust law clings to its traditional association
with equity, [it] contains two limitations that substantially narrow the scope of constructive
trust remedies.”).
121. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 117, § 1 cmts. b, f.
122. See Powell, supra note 115, at 11.
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relationship grounded in fiduciary duty into a liberal remedial device
designed for rectifying unjust enrichment of all kinds.123 Because of
this, many otherwise culpable defendants escaped liability. A defen-
dant’s breach of loyalty may have been both cynical and blatant, but
courts enforced forfeitures only when plaintiffs could demonstrate the
violation of a preexisting right. Regardless of the equities, chancery
courts simply would not manufacture a duty out of thin air.124 The
result was that “faithless agents” like Beatty routinely escaped liability
because they were not considered to fall within any analogous confi-
dential relationship to their employer, such as a trustee, executor,
guardian, or the like.
Cardozo’s opinion in Beatty represents a wholesale rejection of
the constructive trust doctrine’s origins in trust-by-analogy situations.
At the time, while the law held that an agent who broke a covenant to
refrain from other business was not chargeable as a constructive trus-
tee for the profits of the forbidden venture,125 equity recognized an
exception for fraud or concealment in contract formation, and this
provided Cardozo with the necessary rhetorical leverage for trans-
forming the doctrine’s nature.126
Analyzing precedent, Cardozo declared that the rule derived
from prior cases was merely an “illustration of a principle still
larger.”127 It is in this context that Cardozo proclaimed the maxim,
which subsequently came to define the modern understanding of the
constructive trust: “A constructive trust is the formula through which
the conscience of equity finds expression. When property has been
123. See, e.g., Campbell v. Drake, 39 N.C. (4 Ired. Eq.) 94, 96–97 (1845) (refusing to
apply the doctrine to a thieving employee); Peixouto v. Peixouto, 181 P. 830, 833–34 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1919); Stewart v. Todd, 173 N.W. 619, 622–24 (Iowa 1919).
124. Chancery court opinions from this period often comment upon the tremendous
disagreement and splits in authority among various jurisdictions regarding this issue. See,
e.g., Harrop v. Cole, 95 A. 378, 378 (N.J. Ch. 1915) (discussing splits of authority among
various high courts on the subject of constructive trusts, and noting that in “volume 15 of
the American & English Encyclopedia of Law (2d Ed.) at page 1187, cases on both sides of
this question are cited, and it is stated that: ‘It seems to be held by the weight of authority
that a court of equity cannot grant relief’ by holding the agent ‘a constructive trustee.’”).
125. Beatty II, 122 N.E. 378, 380 (N.Y. 1919) (citing Dean v. MacDowell, [1878] 8
Ch.D. 345 (Eng.); Trimble v. Goldberg, [1906] A.C. 494, 500 (H.L.) (appeal taken from S.
Afr.); Aas v. Benham, [1891] 2 Ch.D. 244, 255 (Eng.); Latta v. Kilbourn, 150 U.S. 524,
547–48 (1893)).
126. See Farrell v. Mentzer, 174 P. 482, 484 (Wash. 1918) (denying the imposition of
constructive trust in a breach of contract matter “for the reason that the fraud that is
necessary to create a constructive trust is not, as we have already stated, a mere refusal to
comply with the terms of the contract”).
127. Beatty II, 122 N.E. at 380.
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acquired in such circumstances that the holder of the legal title may
not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest equity converts
him into a trustee.”128 The rhetoric of this epigram is broad, particu-
larly the sweep of its opening statement. Cardozo cited to a Supreme
Court decision, Moore v. Crawford,129 and the leading equity treatise of
his day, John Norton Pomeroy’s A Treatise of Equity Jurisprudence,130 in
support of this formula, yet without acknowledging that these sources
stand for entirely different propositions.131 The distinction, now lost
on most courts, is that cases like Moore typically required either the
existence of a valid contract or a confidential relationship, before the
court could find a “duty” requiring the imposition of a constructive
trust to remedy the fraud and provide the “benefit of the bargain.”
By contrast, the starting point of Cardozo’s inquiry was not the
establishment of a fiduciary relationship and its subsequent abuse.
Neither did Cardozo frame the issue in terms of fraud. Rather, Car-
dozo asked an entirely different question: was the agent “unjustly” en-
riched such that he might be subjected to an “equitable duty” to
return the undeserved benefit? The issue in this mode of analysis is no
longer primarily defined by formal legal duties but by simple fairness.
And here, analyzing the facts in Beatty, Cardozo declared simply: “We
think it would be against good conscience for the plaintiff to retain
these profits unless his employer has consented.”132 The underlying
doctrinal issue—the wisdom of effectively overruling traditional con-
structive trust doctrine—is never explicitly addressed.
Having proclaimed this transformation of constructive trust doc-
trine, Cardozo proceeded to decide the case on entirely different
grounds. The facts indicated that the employer had given oral consent
to Robert Beatty’s purchase of the mining claims for himself. Only
subsequently, did the Guggenheim Exploration Company regret this
decision and sue for the lost profits. The company relied upon a pro-
vision in the written contract nullifying any waiver or amendment not
evidenced in writing. Cardozo rejected this argument, declaring in a
128. Id.
129. Moore v. Crawford, 130 U.S. 122, 128 (1889).
130. 3 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1053, at 2404
(4th ed. 1918).
131. Beatty II, 122 N.E. at 380. Moore involves the court’s equitable jurisdiction over a
fraudulent land transfer where the court held the original contract enforceable despite the
lack of a written contract between the parties. Similarly, Pomeroy’s treatise summarizes
equity case law as applied to fraud or concealment in the formation of contracts for real or
personal property. The distinction, however, is that Cardozo’s inquiry does not begin with
the contract but with the offense.
132. Beatty II, 122 N.E. at 380.
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justly famous aphorism: “Those who make a contract may unmake it.
The clause that forbids a change may be changed like any other. The
prohibition of oral waiver may itself be waived.”133 The holding of the
opinion, as explicitly announced by the court, was that the oral con-
sent gave protection to the agent, thereby acquitting him from any
breach of contract.134
This holding rendered the court’s extensive discussion of con-
structive trust doctrine entirely obiter dicta.135 The irony is rich. The
court that christened the maxim declined its exercise.136 But there is
more. Traditional legal craft values emphasize a duty to reach deci-
sions on the narrowest grounds possible.137 Here, Cardozo compro-
mised those values in pursuit of a larger sense of judicial
responsibility. It would seem Cardozo thought that making his point
about equity and remedies was more useful to the bench and bar than
limiting his discussion to the interpretation of a single contract.138 In
effect, the law could be preserved only by breaking its own rules.
Beatty is one of Cardozo’s most significant opinions in terms of its
impact on the law. The language of its equitable maxims has subse-
quently been cited in almost 500 state and federal cases139 and hun-
dreds more articles and law reports,140 while the Third Restatement of
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment canonizes this opinion as the
source of modern constructive trust doctrine in the United States.141
133. Id. at 381.
134. Id. (“We hold, therefore, that the consent, though oral, gives protection to the
agent, and acquits him of a breach of contract.”).
135. See Saiman, supra note 120, at 1017 (“Cardozo’s inspiring language is obiter dicta, as
Beatty denied the imposition of a constructive trust . . . .”).
136. Margaret A. Wilson, Comment, New Tools for the Creditor, 35 BAYLOR L. REV. 341,
346 n.32 (1983) (“[In Beatty II,] Justice Cardozo concluded that an agent had not breached
his fiduciary duty to his employer, and, therefore, the employer was not entitled to a con-
structive trust. In effect, the court that christened the maxim denied its application.”).
137. See POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION, supra note 111, at 107 (discussing
Cardozo’s similar approach in Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (1921)).
138. Id.
139. See Saiman, supra note 120, at 1017.
140. A Westlaw search conducted January 16, 2012 reveals that Beatty had been cited
1240 times since 1919, primarily for its language regarding constructive trust doctrine.
141. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 117, § 55(2) cmt. a (describing the current sec-
tion of the restatement as little other than “offers a paraphrase of Judge Cardozo’s more
eloquent statement”); see also Chaim Saiman, Restitution in America: Why the US Refuses to Join
the Global Restitution Party, 28 O.J.L.S. 99, 113 (2008) (attributing Cardozo’s decision in
Beatty as the source of the “prevailing theory” of constructive trust doctrine in America).
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Indeed, the Restatement describes itself as nothing more than a pro-
saic “paraphrase of Judge Cardozo’s more eloquent statement.”142
There is no doubt that this case’s fame owes as much to its rhetor-
ical power as to its underlying logic.143 Yet, judges and attorneys who
cite to Beatty seldom discuss or even mention the actual holding.144
Fewer still recognize that its key passages are entirely obiter dicta.145
Likewise, most fail to acknowledge the radical transformation of doc-
trine effected by Cardozo’s opinion. Beatty is the quietest of “revolu-
tionary manifestos.”146
It seems unlikely that the first appearance of this innovation in
dicta was accidental on Cardozo’s part. Throughout the twentieth cen-
tury, courts frequently employed dicta of this kind as a form of pro-
spective overruling.147 Cardozo himself is credited as the founder of
this technique, which he first announced in his 1921 opus, The Nature
of the Judicial Process, and then reaffirmed in a late Supreme Court de-
cision, Great Northern Railway v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co.148 The
courts that embraced this doctrine utilized dicta as a kind of judicial
smoke signal. In this guise, dicta provides guidance for prospective
142. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 117, § 55(2) cmt. a (“The remedy described by
§ 55 is intended to be the same, in scope and in function, as the remedy described by
Cardozo. The object of the present, more prosaic description is . . . . [a]n application for
constructive trust does not require the court to determine a priori what ‘equity and good’
conscience require in a particular case.”).
143. See, e.g., POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATIONS, supra note 111, at 126 (not-
ing that probably the most important factor in the Cardozo’s legal eminence is the “rhetoric
of Cardozo’s opinions”).
144. Powell, supra note 115, at 16 (“I have not encountered a citation to Beatty that
acknowledges that Cardozo’s opinion in that case denied a claim for a constructive trust.
Cardozo’s influence in this area lies not in the holdings of the court for which he spoke,
but in the language he used.”).
145. See id. (noting the absence of a single judicial opinion acknowledging this lan-
guage as dicta); see also Saiman, supra note 120, at 1017 (noting that “few, if any, of the
citing courts or scholars mention” that “Cardozo’s inspiring language is obiter dicta, as Beatty
denied the imposition of a constructive trust”).
146. See Powell, supra note 115, at 16 (“Cardozo’s influence in this area lies not in the
holdings of the court for which he spoke, but in the language he used.”).
147. See, e.g., Spanel v. Mounds View Sch. Dist. No. 621, 118 N.W.2d 795, 803 (Minn.
1962) (explicitly acknowledging its discussion as dicta); State v. Jones, 107 P.2d 324 (N.M.
1940) (prospectively overruling former decisions regarding legality of private lottery); Mu-
tual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Bryant, 177 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1944) (prospectively
redefining interpretation of insurance disability policies); Hare v. Gen. Contract Purchase
Corp., 249 S.W.2d 973 (Ark. 1952) (prospectively overruling prior decisions regarding
usury); see also Prospective or Retroactive Operation of Overruling Decision, 10 A.L.R.3d 1371
(1966).
148. 287 U.S. 358 (1932).
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plaintiffs and defendants alike regarding the evolving direction of the
law. Parties who ignore such dicta do so at their own risk.149
The New York Court of Appeals wasted little time in officially de-
claring this revised constructive trust doctrine as the law of state. Less
than ten years later, the court, in one of the most famous of Cardozo’s
moralistic opinions, held that the imposition of a constructive trust
was not limited to conscious fraud or trust-by-analogy relationships.150
Writing for the court in Meinhard v. Salmon, Cardozo declared that a
joint venturer owed an implied duty towards his coventurer in excess
of any contract or confidential relationship.151 In so holding, Cardozo
emphasized the fundamental ethical dimensions of this remedial in-
quiry: “A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the
market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor most
sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.”152 This epigram, born of
Cardozo’s dicta in Beatty, is still considered the classic statement of the
standard that courts should apply when addressing fiduciary
relationships.153
Beatty is instructive for understanding how dicta functions as a
manifestation of equity. In response to an intractable conflict arising
from ossified legal doctrine, Cardozo utilized dicta to chart a new
course for courts confronting the transgressions of so-called “faithless
fiduciaries.” The enormous success of Beatty and its subsequent canon-
ization in Meinhard suggests that the doctrinal innovation Cardozo in-
troduced into legal discourse was esteemed precisely because it
elevated substantive values over rigid doctrine. No more were courts
powerless to act in the face of financial duplicity or outright fraud. In
a short span of years, the constructive trust was transformed in New
York from a narrow category of predefined legal rules into a broad
remedial catch-all, embodying policy considerations, social mores,
149. See Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 390 N.E.2d 243. 250 (Mass. 1979) (holding,
after disparaging certain covenants in previous case’s dicta, that “parties who executed
such covenants after Ouellette could not reasonably expect that the covenants would con-
tinue to be unenforceable under the [prior] rule”).
150. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION, supra note 111, at 104 (“The most
famous of Cardozo’s moralistic opinions is Meinhard v. Salmon.”). A Westlaw search reveals
that this case has produced some 4261 separate citations in law cases, law reviews, and
treatises as of February 1, 2012, the majority citing Cardozo’s well known aphorism dis-
cussed above.
151. 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
152. Id. at 546.
153. See, e.g., M. P. Narayanan, Cindy A. Schipani & H. Nejat Seyhun, The Economic
Impact of Backdating of Executive Stock Options, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1597, 1617 (2007); Dana M.
Muir & Cindy A. Schipani, The Challenge of Company Stock Transactions for Directors’ Duties of
Loyalty, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 437, 437 (2006).
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and the prevailing equities of the case. The widespread adoption of
this remedial device by American courts followed rapidly.154
The innovation Cardozo crafted in Beatty is profound—a transfor-
mation that effectively merged equity-as-jurisdiction with equity-as-fair-
ness, anticipating the revolution in public law litigation the Supreme
Court later embraced in Brown v. Board of Education. This innovation is
consistent with “Cardozo’s project of making the law serve human
rather than mandarin needs.”155 Yet, he could not have accomplished
this without the creative use of dicta, and if he had attempted other-
wise, it is unlikely that he would have carried the court with him. His
triumph in Beatty is the rarest of all victories—a battle won without a
shot being fired.
B. The Snowball Effect: Outrage as Prophylactic Remedy in
Deshaney v. Winnebago County Department of Child Services and
Mary M. v. North Lawrence Community School Corp.
The snowball effect is a figurative term for a process that starts
from an initial state of insignificance and then builds on itself, becom-
ing ever larger, and more powerful, through time. Like a snowball
rolling downhill, the most trivial event may result in an avalanche of
change. In the realm of the law, many such chain reactions have be-
gun with a few lines of dicta.
Consider the strange fate of the Supreme Court’s decision in
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services.156 The
mother of a boy who had been beaten into a coma by his father
brought a § 1983 suit157 against social workers, who had received
154. See Saiman, supra note 120, at 1017–18. The First Restatement of Restitution can-
onized this interpretation, asserting unconditionally that a constructive trust is remedial.
Following Cardozo, the treatise remarked “[w]here a person holding title to property is
subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that he would be un-
justly enriched if he were permitted to retain it.” RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION
§ 160 (1937).
155. See POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION, supra note 111, at 107. Cardozo did
not think that judges were free in such cases to substitute their own ideas of reason and
justice for those of the people they serve. Id. at 28. Their standard must be an objective,
pragmatic one. Id. “[I]n such matters,” he wrote, “the thing that counts is not what I be-
lieve to be right. It is what I may reasonably believe that some other man of normal intel-
lect and conscience might reasonably look upon as right.” CARDOZO, supra note 94, at 89.
156. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
157. Id. at 193. Suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provide private citizens with a way to bring
claims against states for damages resulting from violations of federal law under the legal
fiction that one is suing a state official in his individual capacity for a violation of § 1983.
The paradigm case for a § 1983 violation is a violation of a citizen’s constitutional rights.
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complaints that the child was being abused, but had not removed him
from his father’s custody. While observing that the facts of the case
were “undeniably tragic,” the Court nevertheless held that the state’s
failure to protect an individual in the face of a known danger did not
violate the Fourteenth Amendment.158 Writing for the majority, Chief
Justice Rehnquist concluded:
While the State may have been aware of the dangers that Joshua
faced in the free world, it played no part in their creation, nor did
it do anything to render him any more vulnerable to them. That
the State once took temporary custody of Joshua does not alter the
analysis, for when it returned him to his father’s custody, it placed
him in no worse position than that in which he would have been
had it not acted at all; the State does not become the permanent
guarantor of an individual’s safety by having once offered him shel-
ter. Under these circumstances, the State had no constitutional
duty to protect Joshua.159
Rehnquist was sympathetic but unyielding—nothing in the language
of the Due Process Clause required the State to protect the life, lib-
erty, or property of its citizens. Yet, something curious followed in
DeShaney’s wake. Many authorities interpreted this passage as dicta,
creating an exception to the DeShaney doctrine, “The State-Created
Danger Theory,” which implied that under different circumstances lia-
bility did exist.160 Lower courts were quick to put this theory into prac-
tice finding states liable in a variety of § 1983 actions.161 More than
two decades later, DeShaney continues to be controversial, prompting a
great amount of literature, including at least one book and several law
158. Id. at 203.
159. Id. at 201.
160. See Phillip M. Kannan, But Who Will Protect Poor Joshua DeShaney, A Four-Year-Old
Child with No Positive Due Process Rights?, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 543, 587 (2009); Jeremy Daniel
Kernodle, Note, Policing the Police: Clarifying the Test for Holding the Government Liable Under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the State-Created Danger Theory, 54 VAND. L. REV. 165, 174 (2001) (“The
rather nebulous ‘creation of danger’ dicta from DeShaney became the seed from which the
lower courts have sown and harvested the state-created danger theory.”); Justin M. Rindos,
Note, Fallen on Deaf Ears: DeShaney Revisted, 21 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 321, 327, 332–36
(2008).
161. See, e.g., Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding a “state-created”
danger, which will support liability under § 1983 for harm resulting from a private actor’s
criminal assault on a victim, exists where state actors used their authority to create an
opportunity that otherwise would not have existed for a third party’s crime to occur); L.W.
v. Grubbs, 974 F.2d 119 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding “state-created danger” where a nurse
working at a state prison was assaulted after being forced by her supervisor to work alone
with a violent sex offender).
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review articles.162 And, the “Supreme Court is regularly asked to revisit
the [DeShaney] issue, and regularly declines, without comment, to do
so.”163
While the dicta of Supreme Court opinions is perhaps the most
volatile of judicial compounds, the use of dicta as a form of equitable
pedagogy is not limited to our nation’s highest Court. Neither does
the tributary of dicta flow only in one direction. As Beatty testifies, an
important decision always has the power to create ripple effects
throughout the legal system. But revolutionary change may follow
from even the most insignificant case.
How this phenomenon plays out in practice is illustrated through
a relatively contemporary example. In 1997, the Seventh Circuit re-
versed the district court in a Title IX sexual harassment suit involving
a thirteen year-old junior high student in Mary M. v. North Lawrence
Community School Corp.164 At the time of the court’s decision, the scope
of Title IX liability in sexual harassment cases was still relatively ambig-
uous. The Supreme Court had previously held, in Franklin v. Gwinnett
County Public Schools, that a school district could be held liable for
damages in cases involving a teacher’s sexual harassment of a student;
the decision, however, did not purport to define the contours of that
liability.165 Writing for the Seventh Circuit, Chief Judge William Bauer
now addressed that ambiguity square on.
The main issue in the case was whether an eighth grade female
student could welcome the sexual advances of a twenty-one year-old
cafeteria employee. The trial court had instructed the jury that this
was a question of fact. The jury ruled in favor of the teenager, but
awarded her nothing in compensatory or punitive damages. On ap-
peal, the Seventh Circuit held that an elementary student could not
welcome the sexual advances of an adult male. Consequently, the trial
court’s instructions were ruled in error. The Seventh Circuit reversed
the jury verdict and remanded the case for a new trial. But, as is often
the case, the scope of the opinion’s dicta was substantially broader
than its actual holding.
Like Beatty, the remedial impulse at work in Judge Bauer’s opin-
ion can only be understood in context. Just two days after oral argu-
162. Linda Greenhouse, A Second Chance for Joshua, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR (June 17,
2010, 8:00 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/17/a-second-chance-for-
joshua/?hp.
163. Id.
164. 131 F.3d 1220, 1228 (7th Cir. 1997).
165. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
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ments in Mary M., the Seventh Circuit had ruled in Smith v.
Metropolitan School District Perry Township that an educational institution
could not be held strictly liable for the actions of its employees in Title
IX lawsuits.166 The court reasoned that there was no sound policy for
making a school district financially liable for the crimes of its teach-
ers.167 Instead, it declared that institutional liability existed only when
a school official had “actual knowledge of the abuse,” was vested with
supervisory authority over the abuser, possessed the power to end
such abuse, “and failed to do so.”168 But the question remained: What
counted as “actual” knowledge?
At trial, the school district, adopting a then-common defense in
Title IX cases, argued that nothing short of conclusive evidence of
abuse satisfied Title IX’s stringent liability requirements. This posed a
kind of Kafkaesque scenario. In essence, the school district insisted
that it had no legal responsibility to act until a student had already
been seriously injured. The threat this stance posed to children was
obvious.
Bauer’s opinion treated the controversy before the court as em-
blematic of this dilemma. He began by noting the “disturbing facts” of
the case, summarizing at length the illicit sexual relationship between
the student and her abuser.169 Throughout, the tone of moral disap-
proval is consistent and unmistakable—with the exception of the
child’s mother, not a single adult, including the district court judge,
escapes criticism. But this commentary was not the most striking as-
pect of Bauer’s decision.
The opinion’s legal analysis begins in an unexpected place.
Rather than address the issue before the court, Bauer took up a differ-
ent topic: the Seventh Circuit’s recent decision in Smith v. Metropolitan
School District Perry Township.170 Nowhere does the opinion comment
on the fact that this entire discussion is obiter dicta, although this
detail is crucial.171 Employing the same strategy observed in Marbury
and Beatty, Judge Bauer took advantage of the nonbinding language
of dicta to communicate the direction of the law. His aim was a de-
166. 128 F.3d 1014, 1030 (7th Cir. 1997).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1034 (quoting Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648, 660
(5th Cir. 1997)).
169. Mary M., 131 F.3d at 1221.
170. Id. at 1224.
171. See, e.g., Thomas Keefe, Right of Action Under Title IX, 197 A.L.R. Fed. 289, § 5(a), at
316 (2004) (noting court’s use of dicta in declaring school principal had knowledge of
sexual relations between student and twenty-one year-old employee).
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marcation of the line in Title IX sexual harassment suits between ig-
norance and willful blindness.
Bauer rejected any inference that the school, under the Smith
standard, was somehow innocent of blame:
Here . . . there is sufficient evidence that a school official knew of
the sexual harassment by one of its employees and failed to re-
spond. Principal Pounds knew that [the girl and her abuser] were
planning to skip school/work the day before they actually did. He
was informed by two people the day before and failed to act on that
information. While Pounds claimed not to have believed one of
the sources, he said nothing as to whether he believed the second
source. . . . He had the power as a school principal to take action,
and failed to do so. . . . The fact that Pounds did not believe these
sources did not excuse him from further investigation.172
The implication was clear: the fact that a “crime” had not yet taken
place at the time administrators learned of the potential threat did
not absolve the school district from responsibility for what followed.
What’s more, as the opinion went on to stress, the fact that the abuser
was a cafeteria employee, rather than a teacher, was immaterial for the
purposes of Title IX. What mattered, Bauer observed, was the sexual
discrimination—not who was “doing the discriminating.”173
While it had no bearing on the outcome of the appeal, the puni-
tive aspect of Bauer’s dicta is striking. Principal Pounds’ actions, for
example, were singled out for significant (and public) condemnation.
Likewise, the opinion highlighted the many failures of the school’s
teachers and staff, while emphasizing that school administrators owe
their charges a heightened degree of responsibility because “[t]he
ability to control and influence behavior exists to an even greater ex-
tent in the classroom than in the workplace, as students look to their
teachers for guidance as well as for protection.”174 And Bauer’s
description of the district court judge, Sarah Evans Barker, is no less
damning. Chastising the lower court for applying the strict require-
ments of Title IX in a case involving an eighth grader, the opinion
observed: “It goes without saying that sexual harassment in the work-
place is vastly different from sexual harassment in a school setting.”175
Yet what “goes without saying” did not keep Judge Bauer from lectur-
ing the trial court on this matter; indeed, the opinion reads at times
like an angry memorandum from a senior partner to a particularly
obtuse junior associate.
172. Mary M., 131 F.3d at 1225 & n.4.
173. Id. at 1225 n.5.
174. Id. at 1226.
175. Id.
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This is not mere homily—this is dicta as equitable remedy. The
opinion’s tone and rhetorical structure evidence the clash between
the legal and moral values at play. Most of those involved were argua-
bly “not guilty” of anything. But the fact that none were subject to
legal liability did not make them any less blameworthy. In Bauer’s
eyes, the general indifference of the school in light of the harm, like
the moral obtuseness of the trial judge, was itself criminal.
Bauer’s dicta provided a measure of symbolic punishment for the
guilty parties. More critically, however, this dicta had a widespread
prophylactic effect on educational institutions throughout the state,
prompting immediate changes in school policy.176 As an initial mat-
ter, the opinion effectively dispelled the previous doctrinal ambiguity
surrounding “actual knowledge” in Title IX sexual harassment suits.
Moreover, it provided notice of the potential liability to all similarly
situated actors. Within the Seventh Circuit at least, Mary M. was the
equivalent of a red flag: a warning that willful blindness would no
longer stand as a viable defense against the sexual harassment of
students.
Word spread quickly. Bauer’s dicta was not a line drawn in the
sand, but a sword hanging over the heads of every school district in
the Seventh Circuit. And the message that “[i]t goes without saying
that sexual harassment in the workplace is vastly different from sexual
harassment in a school setting” was not lost on its relevant audience.
Mary M. was rapidly summarized and its lessons disseminated to
school boards, attorneys, parents, and other courts in the form of
higher education bulletins, legal practice guides, law review articles,
and citations in trial and appellate briefs.177 Likewise, the “height-
ened” standard for school districts in sexual harassment cases sug-
gested by Judge Bauer’s dicta soon found its way into the language of
176. See infra note 178.
177. See, e.g., Thomas C. Britton & W. Bradley Colwell, Survey of Illinois Law: Develop-
ments in Education Law 1997 & 1998, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 967, 972 (1999); Angela Duffy, Can a
Child Say Yes? How the Unwelcomeness Requirement Has Thwarted the Purpose of Title IX, 27 J.L. &
EDUC. 505, 505–06, 510 (1998); Courtney G. Joslin, Recognizing a Cause of Action Under Title
IX for Student-Student Sexual Harassment, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 201, 244 (1999); Martha
McCarthy, Students as Targets and Perpetrators of Sexual Harassment: Title IX and Beyond, 12
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 177, 193 (2001); Martha M. McCarthy, Students as Victims of Sexual
Harassment: The Evolving Law, 27 J.L. & EDUC. 401, 409 (1998); Leon Friedman, New Devel-
opments in Civil Rights Litigation and Trends in Section 1983 Actions, 618 PLI LITIG. & ADMIN.
PRACTICE: LITIGATION 748 (1999); Primary and Secondary Education, 27 J.L. & EDUC. 462,
467–68 (1998).
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other district and appellate court opinions, where it is still regularly
cited with approval.178
If Bauer’s dicta was the equivalent of a single snowball rolling
downhill, the avalanche that followed was nonetheless impressive. Less
than two years later, the issues it raised presented themselves a second
time to the Supreme Court in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School
District.179 This time the Court addressed the liability issue directly.180
Judge Bauer’s opinion was cited with approval by both the petitioners
as well as the supporting amicus curiae briefs.181 Without explicitly
referencing Mary M., the Supreme Court nevertheless endorsed the
implicit premise of its dicta, holding “deliberate indifference” by
school officials in the face of sexual harassment constituted a violation
of Title IX.182 What began as dicta became the law of the land.
C. Burning Down the House of Mouse: Dicta as Punishment and
Rectification in In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation
(Disney IV)
No case in recent memory better illustrates the use of dicta as
equitable remedy than Chancellor William B. Chandler’s opinion in
the infamous Disney litigation.183 The story behind the unraveling of
Michael Ovitz’s ill-fated fourteen-month sojourn inside Disney’s Magic
Kingdom has all the elements of the greatest motion pictures: greed,
betrayal, lies, and the kind of Machiavellian scheming of which even
Machiavelli might have been ashamed. Indeed, the greatest problem
in characterizing Ovitz’s downfall might simply be one of genre: it is
178. See, e.g., Chivers v. Cent. Noble Cmty. Schs., 423 F. Supp. 2d 835, 848 (N.D. Ind.
2006); see also Hendrichsen v. Ball State Univ., 107 F. App’x. 680, 684 (7th Cir. 2004); Evans
v. Bd. of Educ. Sw. City Sch. Dist., 425 F. App’x. 432, 439 (6th Cir. 2011); Crandell v. N.Y.
Coll. of Osteopathic Med., 87 F. Supp. 2d 304, 316, n.132 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Bostic v. Smyrna
Sch. Dist., No. 01-0261 KAJ, 2003 WL 723262, at *6 (D. Del. Feb. 24, 2003); Trentadue v.
Cole, No. 06-1296, 2007 WL 1521556, at *1 (C.D. Ill. May 23, 2007); Doe ex rel. Doe v.
White, 627 F. Supp. 2d 905, 928 (C.D. Ill. 2009); Doe v. Willits Unified Sch. Dist., No. C-09-
03655-JSW (DMR), 2010 WL 2524587, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 2010).
179. 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
180. Id. at 281.
181. See Brief for Petitioners, Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274
(1998) (No. 96-1866), 1998 WL 19745, at *18, *20, *37; Brief of Nat’l Women’s Law Cent.
et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524
U.S. 274 (1998) (No. 96-1866), 1998 WL 47598, at **13–14; Brief of the Nat’l Educ. Assoc.
as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist, 524 U.S.
274 (1998) (No. 96-1866), 1998 WL 19697 at *7.
182. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290.
183. Disney IV, 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005). The facts here follow from the court’s
summary at 697–745, a narrative whose length falls just short of the average Russian novel.
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unclear whether this tale of hubris and wretched excess is best de-
scribed as comedy, tragedy, or epic folly.
In 1996, Ovitz earned $130 million for fourteen months of work
as the president of the Walt Disney Company. His tenure as a Disney
executive was routinely described as a disaster, and the lucrative terms
of his dismissal caused outrage among Disney shareholders. Subse-
quently, it was discovered that his employment contract contained a
series of perverse incentives, hidden like a ticking time bomb, inside
the deal.184 By guaranteeing full payment, even in the event Ovitz was
fired, the contract created a situation in which Ovitz would maximize
his profits by terminating his employment as soon as possible. The
result was predictable.
Ovitz’s contract had initially been vetted by a three-person troupe
of Disney’s compensation committee, including the actor Sidney Poi-
tier. Mr. Poitier participated in the review by conference call, phoning
from his yacht in the Mediterranean Sea. The call approving the con-
tract took all of twenty minutes. The contract was subsequently ratified
by the full board of directors. Not a single director ever read the ac-
tual contract or inquired regarding the potential for financial disaster.
In the wake of Ovitz’s departure, litigation ensued.
The magnitude of the board’s blunder in awarding a $130 mil-
lion employment contract, whose terms perversely created a situation
in which doing a bad job made more economic sense than doing a
good job, outraged shareholders and formed the basis of a lawsuit
against those responsible for the subsequent debacle. The share-
holder plaintiffs, who pursued the case for eight years, wanted Ovitz’s
severance and interest returned to Disney. They accused Disney CEO,
Michael Eisner, who was Ovitz’s close friend, and the former board
members who hired Ovitz as company president in 1995, of breaching
their duties and wasting the company’s money, potentially making
them personally liable for up to $262.2 million in damages, including
more than $120 million in interest.185 By the time the case found its
way before Chancellor Chandler of the Delaware Court of Chancery
in 2005, the stage had been set for an epic showdown.
184. See id. at 703–04. Under the clause, if Disney fired Ovitz, other than for gross
negligence or malfeasance, Ovitz received his entire unpaid compensation as severance
pay: the balance of his salary, including his $7.5 million annual bonuses, three million
shares in stock options, and $10 million in lieu of stock earned if the contract was not
mutually renewed. Id.
185. Jesse Hiestand, Judge Clears Dis Board, Scolds ‘Monarch’ Eisner, HOLLYWOOD REP.,
Aug. 10, 2005, at 1.
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Like the current SEC civil lawsuit against Goldman’s Fabrice
Tourre, the background to the Disney litigation is best understood in
the context of a larger national economic crisis, one involving both a
failure in American corporate governance and a stunning growth in
the level of executive compensation.186 The spectacular, highly publi-
cized frauds at Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco had exposed significant
problems with conflicts of interest in incentive compensation prac-
tices. As a result, Delaware faced a real threat of federal authorities
usurping its powers in the arena of corporate governance.187 Politi-
cians and media alike “questioned the ability of state corporate laws to
prevent director misconduct.”188 Consequently, many legal analysts
forecasted that the Delaware courts might try and preempt such an
encroachment by taking a more activist approach in their historic role
of setting national standards for corporate governance.189 Numerous
academics and practitioners predicted the court might finally en-
hance director accountability by enforcing the often cited, but rarely
utilized, fiduciary duty of good faith.190 Many expected, at last, a radi-
cal shift in Delaware law.191
186. See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corpo-
rate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1, 44–46 (2005) (commenting that as a tsunami of
corporate malfeasance devastated financial markets, “principles that had long formed the
background context of corporate governance and corporate law adjudication were sud-
denly pushed into the foreground and sharply contested, ultimately leading to a presiden-
tial promise, federal legislation, and a host of administrative and other rulemaking
proposals”).
187. Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform
(And It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 985 (2003) (“[I]n terms of regulatory com-
petition or federalism, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act could be construed as a subtle warning to
Delaware to compel its own reexamination of its legal framework.”).
188. Jaclyn J. Janssen, Note, In re Walt Disney Derivative Litigation: Why Stockholders
Should Not Put Too Much Faith in the Duty of Good Faith to Enhance Director Accountability, 2004
WIS. L. REV. 1573, 1609 (2004).
189. See Griffith, supra note 186, at 44–47; E. Norman Veasey, Musings from the Center of
the Corporate Universe, 7 DEL. L. REV. 163, 163 (2004) (“[V]igilance is needed because Dela-
ware’s corporate preeminence is more vulnerable to a pervasive federal encroachment now
than it was before [the scandals].”).
190. See, e.g., Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 464 (2004)
(“[G]ood faith offers powerful incentives for making better corporate governance deci-
sions.”); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Derivative Impact? Some Early Reflections on the Corporation Law
Implications of the Enron Debacle, 57 BUS. LAW. 1371, 1385–86 (2002) (noting that since cor-
porations can include exculpatory provisions in their charters to prevent directors from
being held personally accountable for duty of care breaches, stockholders must rely on the
“state of mind (i.e. the good faith) of the outside directors” to challenge director action).
191. See, e.g., Janssen, supra note 188, at 1579. Traditionally, “the duties of loyalty and
due care are often referred to as the core fiduciary duties [in corporate law] because Dela-
ware courts very rarely invoke the duty of good faith.” Id. This left players in the corporate
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They were almost certainly disappointed. What observers miscal-
culated was the extent to which existing law tied the hands of the
court. Historically in the Chancery Courts of Delaware, decisions by
boards, as well as the compensation committees appointed by boards,
have been protected by the “business judgment rule.”192 The basic
thrust of this rule is that boards must compensate their executives at
levels that are “reasonable.”193 However, Delaware courts grant boards
broad discretion in determining what constitutes reasonable pay.194
This policy is bolstered by the widely held belief that courts are no
better at valuing an executive’s worth than a properly functioning
board, and therefore judicial review of such decisions is worse than
pointless.195
Owing to these prudential concerns, Delaware law weighs heavily
against permitting lawsuits by disgruntled shareholders. Absent a
showing of “oppression, fraud, abuse, bad faith, or other breach of
trust,” Delaware courts will not substitute their judgment for that of
corporate directors.196 This was to prove a high bar for the plaintiffs
in the Disney litigation. Like the courts in Marbury, Beatty, and Mary
M., Chancellor Chandler found himself in a quandary. It appeared,
once again, while the defendants were blameworthy, none were guilty.
The resulting opinion embodies, but also resolves, this contradic-
tion. In line with Delaware’s traditional policy concerns, Chandler em-
phasized that the Disney board could not have violated the law as long
world without any firm sense of when and how that duty would apply. Id. Consequently,
questions regarding good faith persisted.
192. Douglas C. Michael, The Corporate Officer’s Independent Duty as a Tonic for the Anemic
Law of Executive Compensation, 17 J. CORP. L. 785, 803 (1992).
193. See, e.g., West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. J.P. Stevens & Co. (In re J.P. Stevens & Co.
S’holders Litig.), 542 A.2d 770, 780–81 (Del. Ch. 1988) (observing that the presumptive
validity of a business judgment is rebutted only in those rare cases where the decision
under attack is “so far beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment that it seems essentially
inexplicable on any ground other than bad faith”); see also James R. Ukropina, Executive and
Director Compensation—The Controversies Continue: How Much? Who Should Decide? What Are the
Appropriate Roles for the Board and for the Courts? And What Is an “Independent” Board?, SE039
ALI-ABA 139, 142 (1999), available at WL SE139 ALI-ABA 139.
194. West Point-Pepperell, 542 A.2d 770; see also Wilderman v. Wilderman, 315 A.2d 610
(Del. Ch. 1974) (detailing judicial roadmap for determining what is reasonable
compensation).
195. Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653, 679–80 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (“Courts are ill-
equipped to solve or even to grapple with these entangled economic problems.”), aff’d
mem., 32 N.Y.S.2d 131 (App. Div. 1941).
196. Ukropina, supra note 193, at 144 (arguing that absent a showing of “oppression,
fraud, abuse, bad faith, or other breach of trust,” courts are reluctant to substitute their
judgment for that of corporate directors).
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as they had followed reasonable procedures.197 The “degree to which
Ovitz’s compensation package was shocking” to the average share-
holder was therefore not central to the good faith analysis.198 Indeed,
because Ovitz was considered a “superstar executive,” the court ob-
served, it was not unusual that large financial incentives would be re-
quired to lure him to Disney.199
Reviewing the facts, Chandler concluded that, while Ovitz’s com-
pensation was large, nothing about the board’s decision-making pro-
cess suggested bad faith in connection with the approval of Ovitz’s
employment agreement and no-fault termination. As such, Chandler
found that the plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden to demon-
strate that the directors had acted in a grossly negligent fashion.200
Despite finding serious deficiencies in Disney’s compensation prac-
tices, Chandler held that the board’s conduct did not constitute a
breach of their duty of good faith.201 The directors had seemingly won
a complete victory, frustrating the desire of shareholders for more ex-
tensive protection of their financial interests.
In the wake of the Disney litigation, scholars and shareholders
alike despaired that the court had squandered an opportunity to de-
velop and enforce a more robust definition of good faith.202 While
acknowledging that, given the facts, the court had likely issued the
correct decision, critics nevertheless faulted Chandler for not taking
more significant action.203 Such criticism, however, failed to appreci-
ate the powerfully remedial aspects of Chandler’s dicta.
The punitive intent behind Chandler’s opinion is evident from its
opening pages. Chandler was short and to the point in explaining his
refusal to dismiss the case on summary judgment grounds:
I concluded that the complaint, together with all reasonable infer-
ences drawn from the well-plead allegations contained therein,
could be held to state a non-exculpated breach of fiduciary duty
claim, insofar as it alleged that Disney’s directors “consciously and
intentionally disregarded their responsibilities, adopting a ‘we don’t care
197. Disney IV, 907 A.2d 693, 755–57 (Del. Ch. 2005).
198. Janssen, supra note 188, at 1608.
199. Ukropina, supra note 193, at 146.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Disney, Good Faith, and Structural Bias, 32
J. CORP. L. 833, 834 (2007).
203. See id. at 834–35; David Rosenberg, Galactic Stupidity and the Business Judgment Rule,
32 J. CORP. L. 301, 320–21 (2007).
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about the risks’ attitude concerning a material corporate
decision.”204
Chandler’s remarks about the “devil may care attitude” of Disney’s
board were much noted—both by the media and the Delaware Su-
preme Court in the subsequent appeal.205 But these striking remarks
only hinted at the maelstrom of censure to come. Throughout the
next 174 pages, Chandler availed himself of every conceivable form of
dicta—as hypothetical, conjecture, editorial comment, and sarcastic
aside—to illustrate and punish the many failures of Disney’s upper
management. Indeed, the Disney opinion, in its sheer ambition and
rhetorical imagination, is a paradigmatic example of a practice first
observed in Beatty: the creative use of dicta for bringing law into phase
with ordinary moral expectations.
The equitable tension at the heart of the case frames Chandler’s
discussion. The central obstacle to finding liability in the case, as
Chandler acknowledged, was that, as a matter of law, Delaware courts
would not hold fiduciaries liable for a failure to comply with the “as-
pirational ideal of best practices.”206 This was no different, Chandler
observed, than the common law prohibition against holding physi-
cians liable for utilizing “merely competent or standard” medical
treatment practices, lest the “average medical practitioner” be found
inevitably derelict.207 But as Chandler’s “by the way” asides made
clear, his appraisal of Disney’s management was far from an endorse-
ment. The conduct at issue, he noted, was not merely “average,” but
seriously deficient. “As I will explain in painful detail hereafter,”
Chandler wrote, “there are many aspects of defendants’ conduct that
fell significantly short of the best practices of ideal corporate govern-
ance.”208 The opinion more than delivers on this promise, narrating
in grisly detail the various shortcomings of Disney’s management and
directors, while highlighting every significant and embarrassing aspect
of the Ovitz debacle, including whether Ovitz’s personal deficiencies
stemming from his nature as a “pathological liar” might have trig-
gered a legitimate excuse for terminating Ovitz’s contract without pay-
ing his enormous severance package.209
204. Disney IV, 907 A.2d 693, 754–55 (Del. Ch. 2005).
205. See, e.g., Hiestand, supra note 185, at 2; In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.
(Disney V), 906 A.2d 27, 63 (Del. 2006).
206. Disney IV, 907 A.2d at 697.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 719, 726–28.
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Chandler reserved his harshest criticisms for Disney CEO Michael
Eisner, specifically citing him as “the most culpable of the defend-
ants,” an “imperial” CEO enthroned “as the omnipotent and infallible
monarch of his personal Magic Kingdom,” whose “Machiavellian” na-
ture was to a large extent “responsible for the failings in process that
infected and handicapped the board’s decisionmaking abilities.”210
Among his many misdeeds, Eisner was criticized for stacking the
board with cronies and ignoring his responsibility to insure genuinely
independent discretion on the part of Disney’s board of directors.211
Likewise, Chandler scolded the CEO for unilaterally committing the
company to hiring Ovitz with one of the richest pay packages in U.S.
history, commenting sardonically that “Eisner’s actions in connection
with Ovitz’s hiring should not serve as a model for fellow executives
and fiduciaries to follow.”212
Neither did Disney’s board of directors escape their share of the
blame. In his closing remarks, Chandler laid responsibility for the
Ovitz debacle at their feet: “Are there many aspects of Ovitz’s hiring
that reflect the absence of ideal corporate governance? Certainly, and
I hope that this case will serve to inform stockholders, directors and
officers of how the Company’s fiduciaries underperformed.”213 For
the defendants, this outcome was less a vindication than a Pyrrhic vic-
tory par excellence—a victory so costly it is doubtful it gave any gain to
the winners.
But if Eisner and his fellow directors were the real losers in Disney,
then a different question is presented: Who won? The likely answer is
“shareholders.” As numerous commentators have observed, the Dela-
ware corporate community is small, relatively homogenous, and
highly interconnected.214 Decisions of the Chancery courts are closely
watched and generate extensive media coverage. In the immediate
wake of the Chancery Court’s decision, law firms across America
swamped their clients with written analyses of the opinion’s implica-
tions, and advised corporate boards of directors to significantly alter
their compensation practices.215 Boardrooms were forced to take no-
210. Id. at 760, 763.
211. Id. at 760–61.
212. Id. at 762.
213. Id. at 772.
214. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?,
44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1013–14, 14 n.8 (1997).
215. See, e.g., AKIN, GUMP, STRAUSS, HAUER & FELD LLP, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
ALERT: THE DISNEY DECISION: DELAWARE CHANCERY COURT FINDS DIRECTORS DID NOT
BREACH FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN CONNECTION WITH HIRING AND FIRING OF MICHAEL OVITZ
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tice that the rules of the game had changed,216 and the threat of copy-
cat litigation prompted wholesale changes in the compensation
practices at many Fortune 500 companies.217 The nominal defeat of
the shareholders in Disney made little difference. The court’s dicta ef-
fectively reshaped the conduct of fiduciaries throughout corporate
America.
The Disney case illustrates how courts go about setting (and rais-
ing) standards of conduct through the creative use of dicta. For exam-
ple, while admitting that, “at least in the corporate fiduciary context, it
is probably easier to define bad faith rather than good faith,”218 Chan-
dler nevertheless took it upon himself to provide the most substantive
and authoritative discussion of good faith in the history of the court,
effectively redefining its meaning within Delaware law.219 In a maxim
subsequently adopted by the Delaware Supreme Court,220 Chandler
observed that the failure to act in good faith could be demonstrated
by any one of three primary failures: (1) “where a fiduciary intention-
ally acts with a purpose other than that of advancing the best interests
of the corporation”; (2) “where the fiduciary acts with the intent to
violate applicable positive law”; or (3) “where the fiduciary intention-
ally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a
conscious disregard for his duties.”221 Of these duties, only the last was
genuinely at issue in the Disney litigation, rendering much of this dis-
cussion dicta. But while dicta, this discussion was not anything like
trivial or insignificant—it effectively announced a sea change in Dela-
ware law. Not just the defendants, but corporate fiduciaries every-
where, were put on notice: a new sheriff was in town and his name was
(2005), available at http://www.akingump.com/docs/publication/795.pdf; HUNTON &
WILLIAMS LLP, CLIENT ALERT: DELAWARE CHANCERY ADDRESSES DIRECTORS’ FIDUCIARY DU-
TIES IN WALT DISNEY CASE (2005), available at http://www.martindale.com/members/
Article_Atachment.aspx?od=304213&id=178114&filename=asr-178116.pdf.
216. Steven J. Cleveland, Process Innovation in the Production of Corporate Law, 41 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1829, 1854 (2008) (“The court generally advised Compensation Committees
and boards regarding the information component of the business judgment rule. Compli-
ance with the advice may benefit shareholders via a more informed directorate and may
benefit directors by enabling them to more easily attain dismissals of suits challenging their
judgment.”).
217. Hill & McDonnell, supra note 202, at 854.
218. Disney IV, 907 A.2d at 753.
219. See Hill & McDonnell, supra note 202, at 845.
220. Disney V, 906 A.2d 27, 66–67 (Del. 2006) (holding that that the “universe of fidu-
ciary misconduct” cannot be limited to self-interested disloyalty or gross negligence: “This
third category is what the Chancellor’s definition of bad faith—intentional dereliction of
duty, a conscious disregard for one’s responsibilities—is intended to capture.”).
221. Id. at 67.
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“good faith.”222 In less than a year’s time, the Delaware Supreme
Court completed this process, alchemizing dicta into law with its adop-
tion of Chandler’s good faith standard in Disney V.
Likewise, Chandler’s biting comments on the board’s many pro-
cedural failures effectively rewrote the book on standards of care for
corporate boards. Post-Disney, for instance, boards no longer have li-
cense to approve massive compensation packages without detailed
and lengthy appraisals of the potential downsides and consequences
for the corporation. This conduct is now bad faith per se because, as
Chandler emphasized, “[the] Court strongly encourages directors and
officers to employ best practices as those practices are understood at
the time a corporate decision is taken.”223 In response, companies
across the United States quickly revamped their compensation prac-
tices.224 The result was a transformation of what had previously been
best practices into ordinary standards of care.225
Scholars have seized on Disney as a paradigmatic example of the
“illustrious history of cases that have had long-term impact for other
than their ultimate legal holding.”226 In particular, this case has been
described as “a classic example, and a somewhat novel one, of how a
court of law can make law without making law by relegating the final
222. Joseph M. McLaughlin, Good Faith: A New Sheriff in Town?, DIRECTORS’ AND OF-
FICERS’ LIABILITY (Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, New York, N.Y.), Feb. 9, 2006, available
at http://www.stblaw.com/content/publications/pub537.pdf.
223. Disney IV, 907 A.2d at 697 (emphasis added).
224. Hill & McDonnell, supra note 202, at 854.
225. This process was aided substantially by the Delaware Supreme Court in their af-
firmance of Chandler’s decision. Their reasoning was largely, if not entirely, defined by the
lower court’s dicta. Contrasting “what actually happened here” with “what would have oc-
curred” had the compensation committee followed best practices, the Court found the
Disney directors’ conduct had fallen short of current best practices and detailed practices
future boards should adopt in similar circumstances. Disney V, 906 A.2d at 56. Specifically,
the Court recommended that compensation committees should: (1) receive detailed finan-
cial spreadsheets illustrating all foreseeable compensation and termination scenarios; (2)
in conjunction with explanations provided by the expert who prepared the report; (3)
which the committee relies upon to form the basis for its deliberations and the decision of
the committee. “Had that scenario been followed,” the Court commented, “there would be
no dispute (and no basis for litigation) over what information was furnished to the com-
mittee members or when it was furnished.” Id.; JAMES F. REDA, STEWART REIFLER & LAURA G.
THATCHER, THE COMPENSATION COMMITTEE HANDBOOK 99 (3d ed. 2008) (“Whether or not
in a defensive position, the clear lesson from Disney (and now widely accepted best prac-
tice) is that, when considering employment, severance, or retirement agreements for man-
agement, the compensation committee should insist on reviewing numerical illustrations
of the effect of the proposed benefits under various scenarios.”).
226. See, e.g., Tamar Frankel, Court of Law and Court of Public Opinion: Symbiotic Regula-
tion of the Corporate Management Duty of Care, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 353, 354 (2007).
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judgment to the Court of Public Opinion.”227 As generally agreed,
courts have an important role in the creation of social norms.228 In
fact, some have suggested the expressive function of courts is as signif-
icant as their adjudicative function.229 Courts, on this theory, rather
than simply being the arbiters of disputes between private parties, are
the guardians of social morality, instructing members of society how
to act through highly textured, fact-specific, and inherently normative
accounts of corporate actors’ behavior.
Edward Rock, for instance, describes Delaware law as consisting
of a set of informal mechanisms by which corporate norms are trans-
mitted.230 These include not just the narrative stories contained
within the opinions of the Delaware courts, but speeches, articles, and
out-of-court statements made by Delaware judges to the media. In this
regard, Rock asserts “we come much closer to understanding the role
of courts in corporate law if we think of judges more as preachers than
as policemen.”231
At the heart of Rock’s analysis is the claim that standards in Dela-
ware law work very differently than rules. Rock argues that standards
are generated through a “distinctively narrative process, leading to a
set of stories that is typically not reducible to a rule.”232 Rather, Rock
suggests Delaware judicial opinions “can be understood as providing a
set of parables—instructive tales—of good managers and bad manag-
ers, of good lawyers and bad lawyers, that, in combination, fill out the
normative job description of these critical players.”233
But this analysis, while enlightening, is not without its limitations.
Describing Delaware courts solely in terms of their expressive function
as “preachers” obscures equity’s role as a corrective mechanism within
the law. The Chancery court’s decisions do more than simply set the
stage on which Delaware’s morality tales are played out for a captive
audience of well-heeled swells and their attorneys. Of equal impor-
227. Id. at 355.
228. See generally MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 14–26
(1988).
229. See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 586
(1998); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2021–22
(1996) (examining law’s role in articulating desirable norms rather than simply managing
behavior).
230. See generally Rock, supra note 214 (arguing that Delaware corporate law is best
understood as an attempt by Delaware courts to create social norms in the form of judicial
“parables” for senior managers, directors, and the lawyers who advise them).
231. Id. at 1016.
232. Id.
233. Id.
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tance is the power of the court to “correct” wrongs—that is, to restore
injured plaintiffs to their rightful position. As we have seen, this is a
power courts enjoy, even when no legal remedy presents itself. In Dis-
ney, the court’s public acknowledgement of wrongdoing on the part of
company management was itself a symbolic remedy with deep ethical
and political significance.
Even in victory, the defendants did not escape a measure of jus-
tice. Eisner lost his CEO position with Disney in the wake of the fall-
out.234 Ovitz saw his once fearsome persona exposed as
monomaniacal sham. And today, not a single defendant remains on
the board of directors. If the reputations of all involved have not been
completely destroyed, they are certainly in tatters, unlikely to be re-
paired or redeemed, even in a town that loves nothing more than a
happy ending.
IV. Dicta and Its Discontents: The Criticism of Dicta as
Equitable Remedy
Thus far, I have argued that a nuanced understanding of dicta
requires that we grasp its utility as a form of equitable remedy. In this
part, I consider three critiques of that view. The first, which I term the
legitimacy critique, attacks the use of dicta as a form of unprincipled
judicial lawmaking. The second, which is related, argues that however
well or poorly courts are designed for lawmaking, their structural limi-
tations ensure that the ill-considered nature of dicta inevitably results
in bad law. The third critique urges that shaming otherwise innocent
parties violates our standards of both fairness and due process. In con-
sidering and rejecting these critiques, I suggest that what their failure
reveals is the paradox of dicta: that is, the essential necessity of what is
otherwise regarded as “trivial,” “ill-advised,” “unnecessary,” and “be-
sides the point.”
A. The Critique of Dicta as Illegitimate
Despite its ubiquity, the use of dicta as remedy strikes many as
discretion’s evil twin.235 Advocates of judicial restraint are understand-
234. JAMES B. STEWART, DISNEY WAR 541 (2005).
235. See, e.g., Lebovits, Curtin & Solomon, supra note 15, at 255–56 (“Dicta—often ad-
ded to placate, or even impress, the opinion’s audience—distracts the reader from the
issues. Although some doctrines have arisen from dicta, it is not the way to develop legal
precedent. A judicial opinion should resolve only the pertinent controversy and not discuss
superfluous matters. Dicta should be limited because it has the potential to obscure hold-
ings, make incorrect predictions, pressure officials in other branches of government, and
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ably alarmed by the use of dicta to accomplish what otherwise lies
outside the purview of the courts. They insist that, when judges can
evade the enforcement of unpalatable laws, the result is hardly better
than lawlessness itself—a state of arbitrary legal capriciousness mas-
querading as justice. Like a criminally exploited loophole, dicta is la-
mented by these critics as a form of judicial “self-abuse.”
The strongest of these criticisms inevitably bring to mind the
counter-majoritarian difficulty inherent in judicial review.236 The
counter-majoritarian problem is well known: “[J]udicial review em-
powers unelected, largely unaccountable judges to invalidate the pol-
icy decisions of more majoritarian governmental institutions.”237
Likewise, a problem arises for any form of democratic governance “if
judges, appointed for life, exercise the power to make law simply by
writing it into their decisions, regardless of whether the newly de-
clared rule plays a role in the decision of the case.”238
As Michael Klarman has observed, virtually all modern constitu-
tional theory consists of attempts to ameliorate this problem by locat-
ing the foundations of judicial review in something other than judges’
individual policy preferences.239 These theories, of which originalism
is perhaps the paradigmatic modern example, strive for an “objective”
implementation. That is, they seek criteria of sufficient determinacy
that judges of all political persuasions might derive consistent results
in applying the theory to particular cases.240 The use of dicta as a tool
to rewrite unpopular laws or doctrines strikes many as the unprinci-
pled substitution of an individual judge’s preferences for those of the
majority.
This is a powerful critique. “Given that the court’s sole constitu-
tional authority [under Article III] is to decide cases [or controver-
sies],” Judge Leval asks, “what should we make of the constitutional
legitimacy of lawmaking through proclamation by dicta?”241 Such judi-
cial fiat appears unjustified. Courts legitimately make law only as a
‘over explain’ the case. Dicta is primarily a concern for appellate judges, whose opinions
are binding legal precedent. But dicta can also lead trial judges to interpret appellate deci-
sions erroneously.”).
236. The classic description of this problem is ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DAN-
GEROUS BRANCH 16–17 (2d ed. 1986).
237. Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV.
747, 768 (1991).
238. Leval, supra note 14, at 1260 n.26.
239. Klarman, supra note 237, at 768.
240. See id.
241. Leval, supra note 14, at 1259; see also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968) (“[The
case or controversy requirement defines the role] assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite
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consequence of the performance of their constitutional duty to de-
cide cases. They lack constitutional authority to issue rulings other-
wise, just as many state courts are forbidden from rendering advisory
judgments in the absence of a potential controversy.242
There is, however, a powerful response to the charge that dicta as
remedy is unprincipled. Initially, we must observe dicta’s peculiar es-
sence: Dicta is not law. It is merely the possibility of law. As Bradley
Shannon suggests, “The use of dicta is not illegitimate per se.”243 In
particular, dicta plays an important role in the law by communicating
courts’ contemplation of legal change, while at the same time provid-
ing notice to potentially affected parties (including legislatures).244 In-
deed, without such a device, important reliance interests might
otherwise be diminished.245
The abuse of dicta, as its critics all too frequently forget, lies not
with its authors but with its audience. It is this audience—primarily
judges, attorneys, legal academics, and professional commentators—
who determine the ultimate truth-value of dicta. The author does no
more than illuminate a new aspect of existing legal doctrine. In turn,
whether dicta is ignored as a throwaway or seized upon as a radical
alternative is not within the power of the authoring court to control.
Ultimately, the test of any particular dictum’s truth is measured by its
use value for future courts—or future generations. In essence, dicta’s
legitimacy is fundamentally co-extensive with its insignificance. Its vir-
tue is that it can correct the law without betraying the law.
Consider an example. In DeShaney, while refusing to endorse a
constitutional remedy, the Supreme Court was not blind to the injus-
tice suffered by the victim. Having concluded that the state of Wiscon-
allocation of power to assure that the federal courts will not intrude into areas committed
to other branches of government.”).
242. While Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement applies only to federal courts,
declaratory judgment statutes generally do not authorize state courts to give advisory opin-
ions. See 26 C.J.S. Declaratory Judgments § 32 (2011) (setting forth relevant law in a fifty state
survey). Furthermore, “[a] declaratory judgment proceeding is unavailable to secure judi-
cial answers to questions that are theoretical, hypothetical, academic, or abstract.” Id. § 31.
But see Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 436 N.E.2d 935, 947 (Mass. 1982) (noting that
the Massachusetts Constitution gives the court the right to render advisory opinions).
243. Bradley Scott Shannon, The Retroactive and Prospective Application of Judicial Deci-
sions, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 811, 848 (2003) (arguing that dicta is often beneficial in
communicating the possibility of future change in the law); see also ROBERT E. KEETON,
VENTURING TO DO JUSTICE: REFORMING PRIVATE LAW 26–33 (1969) (describing the virtues of
dicta).
244. Shannon, supra note 243, at 848–49.
245. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 402 (1986) (discussing the propriety of warnings
in judicial decisions of impending or proposed changes in the law).
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sin “had no constitutional duty” to protect the injured child, Justice
Rehnquist went on to explore alternative forms of remedy:
It may well be that, by voluntarily undertaking to protect Joshua
against a danger it concededly played no part in creating, the State
acquired a duty under state tort law to provide him with adequate
protection against that danger. . . . The people of Wisconsin may
well prefer a system of liability which would place upon the State
and its officials the responsibility for failure to act in situations such
as the present one. They may create such a system, if they do not
have it already, by changing the tort law of the State in accordance
with the regular lawmaking process.246
For states wishing to afford their constituents the safeguards that fed-
eral courts were unable to provide, Rehnquist’s dicta suggested a con-
stitutional alternative in the form of common-law liability schemes.
This dicta shed light on potential remedies, without compounding the
injustice of an already tragic situation. Subsequently, Rehnquist’s gui-
dance to state courts and legislators, although nonbinding, was cited
in hundreds of opinions grappling with the issues of state actors’ lia-
bility under common law tort schemes.247 But it did so without com-
pelling any particular response.
A second rejoinder to the critique that dicta is unprincipled
arises from the notion of legitimacy itself. A common way of explain-
ing why people obey the rule of law is the suggestion that courts enjoy
some finite stock of a resource known as legitimacy, which can be cul-
tivated but also depleted in a variety of ways.248 “Legitimacy may be
depleted, for example, by decisions that . . . smack of blatant partisan-
ship or unprincipled vacillation, or otherwise blur the between legal
decisionmaking and ordinary political decisionmaking upon which
courts stake their claim to obedience.”249 From this perspective, proc-
lamation by dicta constitutes a substantial withdrawal from the bank of
legitimacy, a withdrawal of the kind that a court cannot make on a
regular basis without jeopardizing future compliance with its deci-
sions. This view of legitimacy yields the prediction that every bit of
dicta a court renders should weaken its capacity to secure compliance
with future decisions.
But conceiving of dicta as an equitable form of remedy, however,
leads to the opposite conclusion. When a law’s consequences are un-
246. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 201–03 (1989).
247. Kannan, supra note 160, at 587 (“[H]undreds of state and federal cases . . . have
cited DeShaney and used its dicta as precedent.”).
248. David S. Law, A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial Review, 97 GEO. L.J. 723, 779
(2009).
249. Id.
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just, one preserves the legitimacy of the law only by denying the ulti-
mate authority of the law. Indeed, a court’s legitimacy cannot long
survive without the popular belief that the laws it enforces reflect the
underlying values of society.250
Legal theorists since Max Weber have argued that the founda-
tions of law do not lie in sovereign commands but rather in social
practices involving the acceptance of authority.251 Indeed, the crucial
role of acceptance for the stability of legal systems becomes most obvi-
ous in times of revolution.252 As Richard Fallon comments, “The com-
mands of the Parliament did not cease to be law in the United States
because Parliament commanded that its decrees should no longer be
law here; [they] ceased to be law because they ceased to be accepted
as such in the former American colonies.”253
Alternatively, consider Herbert Wechsler’s critique of Brown v.
Board of Education. Wechsler charged that Brown failed to establish a
neutral legal principle for invalidating segregation.254 Brown’s absence
of doctrinal justification, he argued, was not just wrongheaded but a
betrayal of the institution of the court. But this criticism confuses the
legitimacy of procedure with the legitimacy of the Court itself in
American life. Indeed, Wechsler’s critique is famously blind to the re-
ality of the dilemma facing Justice Warren and his brethren.
250. See, e.g., DAVID BEETHAM, THE LEGITIMATION OF POWER 15–17 (1991) (defining
legitimacy along three dimensions, including rules that are justified “by reference to beliefs
shared by both dominant and subordinate”); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 25
(2006) (“[L]egitimacy exists when the members of a society see adequate reason for feel-
ing that they should voluntarily obey the commands of authorities.”); Tom R. Tyler, Psycho-
logical Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 375, 378 (2006)
(discussing ways in which legitimacy facilitates state exercise of power because individuals
view authorities as morally or normatively appropriate).
251. Richard H. Fallon, How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 535, 547
n.56 (1999) (“Even if the sovereign’s commands are the law, they are not the law because
the sovereign has commanded that the sovereign’s commands should be law, but because
relevant parts of the population accept the sovereign’s commands as authoritative.”); Tom
R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help the Police Fight Crime
in Their Communities, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 239 (2008) (“[L]egitimacy develops from
the manner in which authority is exercised.”).
252. Fallon, supra note 251, at 547.
253. Id.
254. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1, 19 (1959) (“The courts have both the title and the duty when a case is properly before
them to review the actions of the other branches in the light of constitutional provisions,
even though the action involves value choices, as invariably action does. In doing so, how-
ever, they are bound to function otherwise than as a naked power organ; they participate
as courts of law.”).
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Brown’s major accomplishment was neither the announcement of
a new principle, nor the reversal of an old one. Rather, the Warren
Court’s achievement was in speaking the great unacknowledged truth
of its day: separate but equal was never equal. The impact of this state-
ment in American life was the equivalent of announcing the emperor
had no clothes. The great dissonance in American society was finally
acknowledged outright by its highest court. Like the bloody defeat at
Gettysburg, Brown marked the beginning of the South’s long retreat
from American apartheid.
As others have observed, the use of dicta as a form of prophylactic
remedy is sometimes the only available option for a court committed
to society’s demand for justice.255 For example, Kent Greenawalt
comments:
When the Court decides to accept or reject cases, to decide them
on this ground or that, to issue warning dicta which are then not
made the basis for decision, it is necessarily performing a function
far more complex than Professor Wechsler’s call for candor in
meeting every issue in every case on the basis of neutral principles of
adequate generality.256
Had the Court in fact followed Wechsler’s advice, Greenawalt con-
cludes, “it would have disappeared long ago from [its central place in]
American life.”257
The public’s faith in the legitimacy of the judicial system remains
strong only so long as its courts administer just results.258 As Neal Fei-
genson observes, “in a world of increasing privatization and decreas-
ing faith in elected government, legal cases and especially jury trials
bear an ever-growing and perhaps ultimately unbearable burden of
providing the sense of justice that is otherwise absent from the public
sphere.”259 Writing for the Court in Vasquez v. Hillery, it was Justice
Marshall who explained that “detours from the straight path of stare
decisis”260 have occurred most often when the Court has felt obliged
“to bring its opinions into agreement with experience and with facts
255. Kent Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 COLUM. L. REV.
982, 1008 (1978).
256. Id. (quoting EUGENE V. ROSTOW, THE SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE QUEST FOR LAW 34 (1962)).
257. Id.
258. See Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME
& JUST. 283, 284 (2003) (arguing that citizen’s compliance with the law is powerfully ef-
fected by their subjective belief in the fairness of the courts); see also Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S.
98, 128 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“It is confidence in the men and women who
administer the judicial system that is the true backbone of the rule of law.”).
259. Neal R. Feigenson, Accidents as Melodrama, 43 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 741, 788 (2000).
260. 474 U.S. 254, 266 (1986).
934 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46
newly ascertained.”261 The creative use of dicta allows courts to honor
this responsibility without betraying their obligation to the rule of law.
By utilizing dicta as a vehicle for announcing the direction of legal
doctrine, courts are able to evolve legal standards to meet changing
social need, without violating traditional reliance interests.
“Conversely,” David Law insists, “a court jeopardizes its [legiti-
macy] by allowing people to observe that it is not obeyed,” even when
it is right.262 The Marshall Court refused to assist William Marbury
secure his rightful judicial commission and acquiesced to a “constitu-
tionally dubious” purge of Federalist judges rather than risk political
backlash.263 But today, we do not remember Marbury v. Madison as a
defeat for the sovereignty of the law. Instead, as Law notes, “We re-
member it . . . as the cornerstone of judicial power in this country
because the Court had the strategic sense to assert itself in a ruling
that was at no risk of being disobeyed in any obvious way.”264 Marbury,
like Beatty and Brown, was the assertion of a principle that could only
be realized in the fullness of history. If the equitable power of the
those courts was an illusion, with the passage of time, this illusion has
become reality.265
B. The Critique of Dicta as Ill-Considered
Even someone who believes that dicta can serve useful purposes
may still object that courts are poorly equipped to articulate legal doc-
trine by way of off-the-cuff remarks. According to this critique, courts,
by their manner and operation, risk promulgating ill-considered pre-
cedent by launching their craft into the waters of hypothetical specu-
lation.266 As Judge Pierre Leval complains, “This is never true when
law is made by dictum, which is always—by definition—superfluous to
the court’s performance of its job.”267 Because courts rely primarily on
the briefing of adverse parties, lack research staff, rarely employ neu-
tral experts, and are generally under pressure to enter judgment
promptly, critics argue that lawmaking by courts is best limited to cir-
cumstances where that lawmaking inescapably follows from the court’s
261. Id. (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 412 (1932) (Bran-
deis, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
262. Law, supra note 248, at 782.
263. Id. at 785 (footnote omitted).
264. Id.
265. Id. (describing Marbury as an opportunistic assertion of judicial power: “With the
passage of time, the illusion of power has become the reality.”).
266. Leval, supra note 14, at 1260–61.
267. Id. at 1261.
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performance of its duty to decide cases rather than hypothetical
questions.268
This critique is based in part on considerations underlying the
adversarial system of law.269 Under this model, a judge should avoid
ruling on issues not directly before the court because she lacks the
benefit of “confronting conflicting arguments powerfully advanced by
both sides.”270 When the court issues rulings outside the scope of its
immediate jurisdiction, this salutary benefit is absent. Indeed, in most
such cases the court will be forced to rely entirely upon its own limited
devices “because the parties usually have no interest in [briefing] a
question whose resolution will not affect the result of their case.”271
But consider one response to this critique: the advocate’s prime
loyalty is to his client, not to truth as such.272 Generally speaking,
“truth and victory are mutually incompatible for some considerable
percentage of the attorneys trying cases at any given time.”273 The as-
sumption that truth will emerge from partisan presentations by parties
with diametrically opposed interests is an act of faith not borne out by
many civil and criminal proceedings.274 Indeed, counsel bent exclu-
sively on winning and judges bent on pursuing the truth are not even
playing the same game.
As Marvin Frankel observes, “many of the rules and devices of
adversarial litigation” as conducted in the American system are not
only inappropriate for, “but are often aptly suited to defeat, the devel-
268. Id. at 1261–62.
269. See generally Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV.
353, 385–86 (1978) (arguing that judges work best as neutral arbiters, considering the
arguments presented by the parties or their representatives, avoiding policy-making or
other abstract considerations); Chrysanthi S. Leon, Should Courts Solve Problems? Connecting
Theory and Pratice, 43 CRIM. L. BULL. 879, 882 (2007).
270. Leval, supra note 14, at 1261.
271. Id. at 1261–62.
272. See Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
1031, 1032 (1975) (“[O]ur adversary system rates truth too low among the values that
institutions of justice are meant to serve.”).
273. Id. at 1037.
274. See LOIS G. FORER, THE DEATH OF THE LAW 132 (1975) (“The fairness of this sport
known as litigation is seldom questioned even though the average civil litigant and the
average indigent defendant have about as much chance as the unarmed Christians had in
the gladiatorial combats with the lions in the Coliseum of ancient Rome.”); R. J. Gerber,
Victory vs. Truth: The Adversary System and Its Ethics, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 3, 4 (1987) (“Seven years
on the trial bench yield the conviction that our adversary method . . . is at times a cumber-
some giant that, to some, may exalt trickery and victory over ethics and truth.”); Felicity
Nagorcka et al., Stranded Between Partisanship and the Truth? A Comparative Analysis of Legal
Ethics in the Adversarial and Inquisitorial Systems of Justice, 29 MELB. U. L. REV. 448, 462
(2005).
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opment of truth.”275 Too often, this process achieves truth only as a
lucky accident. Unsurprisingly, those schooled in the Continental sys-
tem insist that a court is far more “likely to make true pronounce-
ments when it acts on its own initiative, rather than when it addresses
issues that have been framed solely by the interested parties before
it.”276
Still, one can recognize the limits of the adversary system but re-
main uncomfortable with the idea of judges as quasi-legislators or phi-
losopher kings. No less a committed pragmatist than Judge Posner
recognizes the limits of discretion: “The idea of [unbridled] judicial
discretion . . . is, no matter how fancied up, a source of unease to the
legal profession.”277 We have no good reason to believe that judges
are in a better position to evaluate policy than democratically elected
legislatures. Neither do we have reason to believe that courts would
function better freed from the normal requirements of stare deci-
sis.278 If judges were free to ignore precedent or the law, then the law
would be nothing more than the will of judges.
Nonetheless, the view of dicta as remedy espoused in this Article
does not require the conclusion that every use of dicta is unprinci-
pled. A judge’s counter-majoritarian power is always checked by signif-
icant bulwarks present in judicial and legal culture.279 As Judge
Posner observes, “The belief that judges are constrained by law, that
there is more to law than the will to power, is a deeply ingrained fea-
ture of the legal culture.”280 Any judge who violates this expectation is
likely to attract professional criticism from his most importance audi-
ence—other judges.281
Central to judicial culture is the belief that any decision must be
justified by neutral analysis and the giving of reasons.282 “For the judi-
ciary,” as Michael Dorf observes, “giving reasons justifies the exercise
of governmental authority, much as elections justify its exercise by the
political branches.”283 Figuratively speaking, such reasons are the cur-
275. Frankel, supra note 272, at 1036.
276. Dorf, supra note 17, at 2002.
277. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 56, at 21.
278. Dorf, supra note 17, at 2004.
279. Id. at 2029.
280. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 56, at 194.
281. Id.
282. David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 737 (1987)
(“A requirement that judges give reasons for their decisions—grounds of decision that can
be debated, attacked, and defended—serves a vital function in constraining the judiciary’s
exercise of power.”).
283. Dorf, supra note 17, at 2029.
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rency by which opinions pay their way in the marketplace of legiti-
macy. “A justice who refuses to explain her decisions might not
thereby commit an impeachable offense,” Dorf concludes, “but she
would lose the respect of the legal community, which, in the long run,
would undermine her ability to translate her views into law.”284
We can now take up what I consider the most troubling question
for any theory of dicta that takes the limits of judicial discretion seri-
ously: When we permit a judge to introduce significant dicta into an
opinion in the form of observations beyond the case, counterfactual
hypotheticals, and other nondispositive determinations, do we not il-
legitimately cede authority over the most important of our contempo-
rary legal problems? And moreover, because this dicta has no
consequences for the holding, do we not risk that such pronounce-
ments will be glib, ill-considered, uttered without careful scrutiny, and
therefore often mistaken?285
Initially, we should note that this criticism is the product of the
intuition that dicta is trivial, contingent, superfluous—in a word, un-
necessary. And if unnecessary, then avoidable. But the model of equi-
table dissonance suggests just the opposite conclusion. As we have
seen, dicta is not merely a convenient judicial tool; dicta in fact plays a
crucial role in legal reasoning.
Dicta’s function in legal reasoning is illustrated by analogy to the
well-known distinction between rules and standards.286 A law requir-
ing drivers to stop at a stop sign is a rule. A law requiring drivers to
proceed “cautiously” when passing through a construction zone is a
standard. When determining guilt or innocence, the application of a
rule depends solely on the existence of specific facts. For example, did
the car stop at the sign?287 But the application of a standard involves a
consideration of the facts in light of complex underlying values. For
example, how fast was the car going? What were the road and visibility
conditions? How much risk does the law allow an individual driver to
284. Id.
285. Leval, supra note 14, at 1268 (arguing that the dangers of dictum uttered without
“paying the price” of considered review outweigh any of its possible benefits in the vast run
of cases).
286. Many scholars have observed this fundamental distinction between rules and stan-
dards. See generally Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards
Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23, 25 (2000) (“Rules establish legal boundaries based on the
presence or absence of well-specified triggering facts.”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The
Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 58 (1992) (“Rules aim to confine the
decisionmaker to facts, leaving irreducibly arbitrary and subjective value choices to be
worked out elsewhere.”).
287. See, e.g., POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 56, at 42–45.
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take when driving through a construction zone? Where is the line be-
tween carelessness and negligence?288
Many legal questions can be answered by the application of clear
and uncontested rules to determinate facts: Is it illegal to drive fifty
miles an hour in a twenty mile per hour zone? Is Illinois’ Governor
entitled to take bribes? Is marriage to one’s sister valid?289 As Judge
Posner comments, the reason these questions do not much figure in
legal debate is that “they are too simple to be a likely subject of litiga-
tion or even to require legal counseling.”290 Their boundaries can be
immediately intuited.291 By contrast, standards are characterized by a
lesser or greater degree of indeterminacy.292 The meaning of a com-
mon law standard such as negligence or an equitable standard such as
unconscionability cannot be defined by reference to itself. Why? Be-
cause to understand what a legal concept like “negligence” or “uncon-
scionability” looks like, you have to know what its opposite—
“prudence” or “fairness”—looks like. The extension of one is demar-
cated by the limits of the other. This is particularly the case when a
court is addressing a relatively complex equitable concept such as the
duty of good faith in the context of fiduciary duties. But how does this
description of “the opposite” emerge? How does one distinguish good
faith from bad faith? In a case involving the miscarriage of justice, the
demarcation of that difference is the province of dicta.
Consider two recent Supreme Court opinions. In Lawrence v.
Texas, while striking down Texas sodomy laws as an unconstitutional
violation of the Equal Protection Clause, the Court was careful to dis-
tinguish all the potential “liberties” that this decision did not protect:
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve per-
sons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in rela-
tionships where consent might not easily be refused. It does not
involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether
288. See Sullivan, supra note 286, at 58 (“A legal directive is a ‘standard’—like when it
tends to collapse decisionmaking back into the direct application of the background prin-
ciple or policy to a fact situation.”).
289. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 56, at 42–43.
290. Id. at 43.
291. Another way of expressing this thought would be to say that rules are like analytic
truths: they contain their own premises. Thus, speeding is going faster than the speed
limit; theft is taking what is not yours. If you understand the premise, then you understand
the truth of the proposition, and vice versa.
292. One must be cautioned that even this quick sketch of rules and standards is de-
ceptive. As one commentator points out, the distinction between rules and standards
marks a continuum, not a divide: “Just as a pure rule can become standard-like through
unpredictable exceptions, a pure standard can become rule-like through the judicial reli-
ance on precedent.” Korobkin, supra note 286, at 29.
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the government must give formal recognition to any relationship
that homosexual persons seek to enter. The case does involve two
adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged
in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle.293
Justice O’Connor was even more explicit in her concurrence, noting
that the fact “this law as applied to private, consensual conduct is un-
constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause does not mean that
other laws distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals
would similarly fail under rational basis review.”294 Justice O’Connor
went on to cite national security and preserving the traditional institu-
tion of marriage as two legitimate state interests not implicated by
Lawrence’s holding.295
Similarly, in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No. 1, Justice Roberts was careful to observe that the Court’s
decision striking down the use of racial classifications in school district
assignment plans did not imply such “cataclysmic” concerns as the in-
validation of the No Child Left Behind Act.296 These are paradigmatic
examples of dicta. Their authors might have asserted contrary posi-
tions (or eliminated this dicta altogether), and the holdings of these
cases would still come out the same. Yet, it is difficult to characterize
either of these pronouncements as judicial overreaching. In both, the
significant dictum in question functions to clarify, rather than con-
fuse, the scope of the holding.
The Chancellor’s dicta in Disney is only a more sophisticated ex-
ample of this phenomenon. Characterizing Disney’s dicta as a series of
ill-considered pronouncements is an error that follows from regarding
dicta as purely contingent, rather than a necessary stage in the resolu-
tion of equitable dissonance. Yet, as we have seen, in a critical sense,
the opinion’s legal reasoning relied upon dicta to arrive at the ulti-
mate holding. That is because it was only through the demarcation of
bad faith—in this case the egregious conduct of Eisner, Ovitz, and the
Disney board members—that the evolving picture of good faith could
come into view.297 Likewise, on appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court
announced that “[i]n our view, a helpful approach is to compare what
actually happened here to what would have occurred had the commit-
293. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
294. Id. at 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
295. Id.
296. 551 U.S. 701, 745 (2007) (“[T]he [cataclysmic] examples the dissent mentions—
for example, a provision of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 that requires states to set
measurable objectives to track the achievement of students from major racial and ethnic
groups—have nothing to do with the pertinent issues in these cases.” (citation omitted)).
297. See Disney V, 906 A.2d 27, 63–67 (Del. 2006).
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tee followed a ‘best practices’ (or ‘best case’) scenario, from a process
standpoint.”298 The court’s subsequent discussion in dicta of idealized
“best practices” clarified the “ordinary” standards of care by which
boards would be judged in the future.299
Disney thus illustrates how dicta functions as a source of illumina-
tion in complex legal reasoning. The court’s use of hypotheticals and
other thought experiments was not blind speculation, but rather a
necessary element of the critical thinking at work in the resolution of
the controversy. In each case, dicta is the hinge upon which the un-
derlying logic of the opinion swings into view. But consequently, the
holding cannot be thought of as a distinctly separate element within
these opinions—dicta and holding must be understood as an implicit
unity.
What does it mean to characterize dicta as one with an opinion’s
holding? Again, it helps to consider the dialectical nature of legal rea-
soning. “Doctrinal categorizations . . . tend to be built on conceptual
oppositions.”300 For example, interdependent legal concepts such as
good faith and bad faith are best described as what Jack Balkin terms
“nested” oppositions: opposed concepts that have a “relation of de-
pendence, similarity, or containment.”301 Typically, these conceptual
oppositions emerge from the opposition of concepts in a particular
context.302 The context of opposition is important because the two
ideas may not even be logically related—and therefore not contradic-
tory—except in a specific context.303
Similarly, legal concepts like good faith and bad faith, even jus-
tice and injustice, exhibit conceptual dependence on each other. In-
deed, their relation is so intimate that as signifiers they can almost be
said to refer to the same signified—two sides of the same coin, rather
than distinct entities. This theory implies, of course, that the appear-
ance of dicta within opinions analyzing legally sanctioned injustice is
inevitable. The limitations of a problematic legal doctrine cannot be
expressed without reference to its opposite. To say what the law is, we
must be able to say what it is not.
298. Id. at 56.
299. Id. (“In a ‘best case’ scenario, all committee members would have received, before
or at the committee’s first meeting on September 25, 1995, a spreadsheet or similar docu-
ment prepared by (or with the assistance of) a compensation expert . . . .”).
300. Griffith, supra note 186, at 36.
301. J.M. Balkin, Nested Oppositions, 99 YALE L.J. 1669, 1671 (1990) (reviewing JOHN M.
ELLIS, AGAINST DECONSTRUCTION (1989)).
302. Id. at 1674.
303. Id. at 1674–75.
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The failure to acknowledge the necessity of conceptual interde-
pendence in legal reasoning accounts for many of the flaws in the
criticism directed at the use of dicta as remedy. This is particularly
true of critics who disparage dicta as “unnecessary.” Fundamentally,
this criticism is characterized by a blindness to the binary opposition
at the heart of the debate—the opposition between holding and dicta
itself. Just as “good” cannot be thought without reference to “evil,”
and “justice” cannot be limned without reference to “injustice,” the
holding of a case is inevitably demarcated by its dicta. Even when dicta
is suppressed within a written opinion, it is never simply “absent.”
The idea that words or concepts stand in a one-to-one correspon-
dence with things is a form of naive realism long abandoned by the
human sciences.304 Whether written or spoken, no element within a
logical system can function without relating itself to another element.
Consider, for example, Saussure’s famous pronouncement that the
structure of language is purely differential: “Whether we take the signi-
fied or the signifier, language has neither ideas nor sounds that ex-
isted before the linguistic system, but only conceptual and phonic
differences that have issued from the system.”305 On this theory,
“[e]very concept is necessarily and essentially inscribed in a chain or a
system, within which it refers to another and to other concepts, by the
systematic play of differences.”306 As Jacques Derrida observes, “Noth-
ing, neither among the elements nor within the system, is anywhere
ever simply present or absent.”307 Rather, each element is constituted
on the basis of the traces within it of all the other elements in the
system.
The consequence to be drawn is that the holding cannot be
thought without reference to dicta. The authority of the holding is
defined by what it is supposedly not: “trivial,” “superfluous,” “contin-
gent.” But accordingly the holding depends on dicta for its mean-
ing—these two concepts are intimately bound in the logic of legal
reasoning.
304. DANIEL CHANDLER, SEMIOTICS: THE BASICS 59 (2d ed. 2007) (“No semiotician or
philosopher would be so naive as to treat signs such as words as if they were the things for
which they stand but . . . this occurs at least sometimes in the psychological phenomenol-
ogy of everyday life and in the uncritical framework of casual discourse.”).
305. JACQUES DERRIDA, SPEECH AND PHENOMENA: AND OTHER ESSAYS ON HUSSERL’S THE-
ORY OF SIGNS 140 (David B. Allison trans., Nw. Univ. Press 1973) (1967) (emphasis added)
(quoting FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, A COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS 120 (Charles Bally &
Albert Sechehaye eds., Wade Baskin trans., Philosophical Library 1959)).
306. Id.
307. JACQUES DERRIDA, POSITIONS 26 (Alan Bass trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 1981) (1972).
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What this discussion reveals is that the criticism of dicta as ill-
considered is itself ill-considered. For example, the criticism of judges’
employment of hypotheticals and other thought experiments as an
illegitimate technique is simply blind to the essential function of dicta
in legal reasoning. Like negative space in paintings, dicta allows the
holding of an opinion to stand out in relief.308 Indeed, dicta, particu-
larly in the form of hypotheticals, functions as the canvas upon which
holdings are painted. This operation is visible whenever a court makes
its thinking explicit.
Even as dicta allows the holding to emerge into light, the shadow
it casts across the page remains conspicuous. The contours of good
faith in Disney, for example, emerge most clearly not through abstract
passages of doctrine, but from the Chancellor’s scathing commentary
on the ethical and professional failures of CEO Michael Eisner and his
fellow board members. Thus, a central claim regarding the necessity
of dicta emerges into view: dicta appears in hard cases not in spite of
the holding, but because of the holding. Dicta is literally the holding’s
dark twin.
C. The Critique of Dicta as Unfair
A problem remains: there is an obvious contradiction between
declaring a defendant innocent of legal fault one moment, but then
punishing that same defendant in the next breath for the identical
conduct. Indeed, critics of dicta argue that this is one more example
of the abuse of judicial discretion—a tool of injustice in the hands of a
tyrannical legal establishment.
They are mistaken. Certainly, the suggestion that dicta operates
as a remedial device, creating liability for defendants where none oth-
erwise exists, opens courts to charges of unprincipled decision-mak-
ing. There, the judge takes a losing claim under established principles
like loyalty and due care, mixes the magic dust of dicta, and suddenly
a plaintiff can snatch victory from the jaws of defeat. In Disney, for
instance, Chandler’s extravagant discussion of bad faith acted as puni-
tive deterrent and prophylactic remedy in a case where the defend-
ants, in theory, prevailed. This struck some as judicial overreaching.
Yet, the use of dicta as remedy appears unprincipled only when viewed
308. In paintings, negative space is literally the space on the canvas between objects. A
simple two-tone image, for instance, depicts the subject in black and leaves the space sur-
rounding it blank (or white), thereby forming a silhouette. RENE PAROLA, OPTICAL ART:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 18 (Dover Publ’ns 1996) (1969).
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from the myopic perspective that splits the purposes of adjudication
into isolated and often conflicting elements.
Private litigation is never genuinely private: “It is in the nature of
adjudication for courts to gather and report information about the
behavior of the parties that come before them.”309 This mission car-
ries with it the power to shape the ethical and commercial practices of
the greater community. Social scientists have suggested that “merely
by collecting and distributing information about how actors behave,
courts can induce people to refrain from bad behavior.”310 Consider,
for example, the lex mercatoria, a private legal code developed by Euro-
pean merchants during the emergence of commercial law in the early
Middle Ages.311 This code was administered by judges who were them-
selves drawn from the merchant ranks. These merchants had little
power to enforce judgments against those who violated the code and
could not call upon the state for assistance. But what they could do
was make information public regarding those who violated these
codes and refused to honor judgments. The prospect of being black-
listed by other merchants ensured a healthy degree of compliance
with both the lex mercatoria and the decisions of private judges.312
Likewise, the role of judges in collecting and transmitting infor-
mation about the behavior of private individuals plays an important
function in popular democratic rule. First, courts that engage in judi-
cial review solve a critical information problem by broadcasting their
investigations in the form of opinions. Only if people are aware of the
bad behavior of their fellow citizens (or their government for that
matter) can they respond appropriately.313 Second, private litigation
plays an important role in shaping the norms and behaviors of the
community.314 Courts do not merely settle controversies between pri-
309. Law, supra note 248, at 745.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. See AVNER GREIF, INSTITUTIONS AND THE PATH TO THE MODERN ECONOMY: LESSONS
FROM MEDIEVAL TRADE 315–49 (2006) (concluding that trade relations in medieval Europe
reflected the operation of a “community responsibility system” sustained in part by the
“imperfect monitoring” that courts performed with respect to traders); Paul R. Milgrom et
al., The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the
Champagne Fairs, 2 ECON. & POL. 1, 2–5 (1990) (arguing that the role of private judges in
transmitting information about past behavior gave traders an incentive to obey their
judgments).
313. See Law, supra note 248, at 786–89 (likening judicial review to a fire alarm mecha-
nism that alerts the public when those with public power have acted unconstitutionally).
314. Tom Ginsburg & Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy: An Expressive The-
ory of International Dispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1229, 1303–1315 (2004) (argu-
ing that tribunals perform signaling and coordination functions that help explain how
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vate parties; written judgments take on a life of their own outside the
courthouse. The very act of deciding cases is simultaneously a trans-
mission of norms and a shaping of expectations.315 In fact, the pri-
mary function of the dicta in Disney, Beatty, and Mary M. was to provide
a quasi-prophylactic remedy, insuring ex ante that the harms addressed
in those cases would not continue to repeat themselves ad infinitum.
To be sure, overruling a prior decision directly compelling an op-
posite result would often lead to substantial unfairness to the losing
party. Notice to litigants is an important aspect of due process. With-
out proper notice, the law regards punishing wrongdoers as itself un-
lawful. Yet, once substantive injustice has been observed, once
innocents have been harmed, the system cannot permit a cycle of iniq-
uity to continue. Consider the SEC’s current civil suit against Fabrice
Tourre.316 That defrauding clients through a form of selective nondis-
closure was legal yesterday does not mean that the courts must en-
dorse such behavior until the end of time. Stare decisis is not a suicide
pact. Rather, the court must, in each instance, weigh the value of pre-
dictability and stability against the likelihood of continuing harm.
As Dorf observes, “When a litigant later presents to the court its
earlier ruling and asks for an unjust or even absurd result, stare decisis
does not require that the court oblige.”317 If precedent thwarts justice
in a truly egregious manner, the appropriate response is an exercise
of the court’s equitable powers, either by directly overruling a past
case or by charting an evolution in the court’s doctrine through can-
didly worded dicta. And, while litigants should not have to guess today
what they may be liable for tomorrow, neither is precedent a license
for the clever to get away with frauds that less imaginative criminals
have neglected.
Beatty, for instance, exemplifies the limits of what a court can
properly do in the face of injustice following from ossified legal doc-
trine. Obviously, there is something profoundly amiss in a legal system
where judges say to each other, “The law requires outcome A, but B
courts command obedience in part by shaping the self-fulfilling expectations on the part of
litigants).
315. See generally Rock, supra note 214, at 1063–72 (arguing that the judiciary’s sermon-
like pronouncements are passed along by counsel and press to a wider audience); Lyman
Johnson & Dennis Garvis, Are Corporate Officers Advised About Fiduciary Duties?, 64 BUS. LAW.
1105, 1119–24 (2009) (arguing that studies reveal that corporate counsel play a critical
role in transmitting information of fiduciary duties to a wider corporate audience).
316. SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
317. Dorf, supra note 17, at 2057.
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makes better policy sense so we’ll go with B.”318 But, at some point,
the outcome that leads to genuinely appalling results is—by that very
consequence—no longer the correct outcome, from either an equita-
ble or a legal standpoint.319 In such cases, dicta is often a court’s only
vehicle for lawfully resolving the controversy before it.
Likewise, describing the dicta in Disney or Mary M. as unwar-
ranted punishment obscures the fundamental equitable principles at
stake. The acknowledgement of injustice, even when the law provides
no legal remedy, is as critical to sustaining the integrity of the courts
as their reliance upon precedent.320 Legal scholars refer to this kind
of public acknowledgement of a past injustice as a “symbolic rem-
edy.”321 A lack of compensatory money damages does not by itself
render this remedy insignificant. For the victims of legally sanctioned
injustice this acknowledgement carries deep psychological resonance.
This is because the failure to acknowledge injustice is itself a form of
further injury visited upon the victims of unjust laws. Such widespread
social amnesia, that mode of forgetting by which a whole society sepa-
rates itself from a discreditable past, erases not only collective guilt,
but the very identities of past victims by denying the reality of their
experience.322
Symbolic remedies, even those issued in pure dicta, provide a
measure of rectification for the dissonance otherwise experienced by
innocent victims. These remedies are themselves manifestations of eq-
uity, a form of struggle against injustice, insisting that far worse than
the crime is the cultural blindness or amnesia which denies that a
crime ever took place.323 The courts’ employment of dicta to acknowl-
edge and criticize legal injustice is thus always more than simply pun-
318. See, e.g., POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 56, at 145 (discuss-
ing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)).
319. Id.
320. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, THE FACES OF INJUSTICE 35 (1990) (“[N]o democratic political
theory can ignore the sense of injustice that smolders in the psyche of the victim of injus-
tice. If democracy means anything morally, it signifies that the lives of all citizens matter,
and that their sense of their rights must prevail. Everyone deserves a hearing at the very
least.”).
321. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Historic Injustice: Its Remembrance and Supersession, in JUS-
TICE, ETHICS, AND NEW ZEALAND SOCIETY 139–45 (Graham Oddie & Roy W. Perrett eds.,
1992) (arguing that apologies and acknowledgments are properly demanded, and at least
symbolic compensation may be due to aboriginal descendants of those who were originally
treated unjustly).
322. Spaulding, supra note 110, at 1998–2001.
323. See generally Waldron, supra note 321, at 141–44. While Waldron does not support
the idea of massive monetary remedies for the victims of past historical injustices, he does,
however, support efforts at redress that he deems symbolic rather than compensatory. The
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ishment or parable. It is also countermemory, the remembrance of an
inconvenient truth that would otherwise be repressed.324
It should not be forgotten that many of the Supreme Court’s
most important pronouncements in the area of civil rights were first
born in dicta. Justice Stone’s suggestion that discrimination against
“discrete and insular minorities” might require “a correspondingly
more searching judicial inquiry” into the supposedly undemocratic as-
pects of the political process in Carolene Products, an opinion holding
constitutional legislative discrimination against unpopular commer-
cial manufacturers, is one such case.325 Justice Powell’s observation
that racial diversity might be a compelling interest in college admis-
sions in Bakke, an opinion striking down the U.C. Davis medical
school’s affirmative action program, is another.326 And the Court’s ad-
monishment that “[d]istinctions between citizens solely because of
their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people,” in
Hirabayashi v. United States, an opinion holding constitutional the cur-
few and relocation of all citizens of Japanese ancestry from the West
Coast during World War II, is a third.327 Similar instances of momen-
tous dicta abound in the history of the Supreme Court’s equal protec-
tion jurisprudence.328
Dicta functions as a principle of resistance in such cases. It ex-
presses legal conclusions clearly at odds with the rationales justifying
federal government’s token redress payments of $20,000 to surviving Japanese American
internees is an example of the sort of symbolic reparations that Waldron supports. Id.
324. See Spaulding, supra note 110, at 2006 (arguing that the significance of the Civil
War and Reconstruction Amendments for federalism principles can only be recovered
through the method of countermemory—a form of historical consciousness that seeks to
reveal both perverse desire animating the self-aggrandizing tendencies of national “his-
tory” and the inconvenient facts it is so prone to forget).
325. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). This pro-
nouncement is widely regarded as perhaps the most influential footnote in American legal
history. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, The Footnote, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 275, 275 (1989); Michael C.
Dorf & Samuel Issacharoff, Can Process Theory Constrain Courts?, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 923,
926 (2001); Felix Gilman, The Famous Footnote Four: A History of the Carolene Products Foot-
note, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 163, 168–69 (2004); Peter Linzer, The Carolene Products Footnote
and the Preferred Position of Individual Rights: Louis Lusky and John Hart Ely vs. Harlan Fiske
Stone, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 277, 277 (1995).
326. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 316–18 (1978).
327. 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
328. For example, school systems relied for over thirty years upon dicta in Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971), regarding the use of the
broad discretionary power of school boards to combat de facto segregation through racial
balancing within districts. Jonathan Fischbach, Will Rhee & Robert Cacace, Race at the Pivot
Point: The Future of Race-Based Policies to Remedy De Jure Segregation After Parents Involved in
Community Schools, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 491, 505 (2008).
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their outcomes. It reveals the Court struggling with itself to map the
boundaries of doctrine. When read against the purported holdings,
the dicta in cases like Carolene Products and Hirabayashi creates signifi-
cant tensions, begging an as yet unrealized redemption, and opening
doors that subsequent courts walk through.
Moral leadership will inevitably be thrust on certain judges—a
role they may play well (as by the Chancellor in Disney) or badly.329 As
Judge Posner observes of his colleagues on the bench: “Much of the
law applied by judges, not to mention the ‘law’ that tells us whether
the rules or for that matter the judges themselves are lawful, consists
of moral and political considerations.”330 How could this be otherwise,
when, “as Holmes himself emphasized, the law is—and should be—
shaped by social needs and interests?”331
Traditionally English judges performed two primary functions:
(1) resolving private disputes and (2) imposing criminal justice.332 A
third, and also traditional, function of courts is the exercise of equity
power to prevent injustice when the law dictates otherwise, either
through error, ignorance, or human fallibility. During periods of our
own recent legal history, the legitimacy of this function has been de-
nied. Indeed, since its merger with our courts of law in 1938, equity
has literally become the ghost in the machine. Yet, judges have exer-
cised broad equity powers since the dawn of the court system. The
demands of equity upon judges in the modern American legal system
are no less real. Even in an age of legislation, every statute has gaps to
fill, ambiguities to decipher, and inadequacies to overcome.
Equity demands that courts uphold not just the letter of the law
but also the spirit of the law.333 The challenge for judges confronting
unjust laws is how to correct the law without betraying it. Dicta is the
magic wand by which courts perform this miracle of justice.
Conclusion
Despite its critics, dicta persists. The question is, “Why?” The ex-
planation for the failure of conventional theories of the holding/dic-
tum distinction to answer this question is now clear. They assume what
they claim to prove (i.e., the insignificance of dicta). These conven-
329. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 56, at 193.
330. Id. at 243.
331. Id.
332. Michael Boudin, The Real Roles of Judges, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1097, 1097 (2006).
333. William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial Power”
in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 1047–48 (2001).
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tional theories have sought to distinguish the difference between
holding and dicta through a variety of formal definitions of what
counts as precedent.334 Some theorists have attempted to define hold-
ings in terms of facts and outcomes, while others have defined hold-
ings in more abstract terms as the rationales underlying opinions.335
What all these theories share in common, however, is the conviction
that dicta is essentially a lack—something deficient, derivative, and
contingent. But their unquestioned faith in the assumption that dicta
is secondary and corrupt has led them to ignore more fundamental
questions. Indeed, they have ignored what might be called the ulti-
mate question: Why is there something, rather than nothing? This ques-
tion leads us back to place from which we started: the hard case, the
case where what is “just” diverges entirely from what is “legal.”
Holmes famously observed that hard cases make for bad law.336
Holmes thought most judges opt for the good result and made bad
law as a result, because in reaching their decision they must distort the
law to get what they consider to be the correct outcome.337 “While this
process may result in justice for the immediate parties,” comments
William Hawkland, “it makes bad law in a jural system that relies on
stare decisis, because it leaves in its wake a ‘twisted law,’” a distortion
that “haunt[s] the counselor and confuse[s] the judge in subsequent
situations not having the same [peculiar] equities.”338 But as we have
seen, there is an alternative open to the judge confronted with the
hard case: the use of dicta as equitable remedy.
334. Dorf, supra note 17, at 1998–99 (arguing that traditional theories of the holding/
dicta distinction defines holdings along a continuum that runs from the concrete (i.e.,
holdings defined in terms of facts and outcomes) to the abstract (i.e., holdings defined in
terms of rationales from prior cases)).
335. See Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 23, at 1045–52 (tracing the history of the
holding/dicta distinction).
336. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400–01 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(“Great cases like hard cases make bad law. For great cases are called great, not by reason
of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but because of some accident of
immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment.
These immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what previ-
ously was clear seem doubtful, and before which even well settled principles of law will
bend.”).
337. William D. Hawkland, The Uniform Commercial Code and the Civil Codes, 56 LA. L.
REV. 231, 241 (1995); see Michael Halley, Breaking the Law in America, 19 LAW & LITERATURE
471, 477 (2007) (“While a person seeking justice as a final destination might hope that the
great case is a triumph of sober and reliable objective discernment over the unfounded
‘conjectures of imagination,’ for Holmes, the great case is bad because ‘it distorts the judg-
ment.’” (footnote omitted)).
338. Hawkland, supra note 337, at 241.
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Here, we must observe again dicta’s peculiar nature. Dicta is not
law; it is merely the possibility of law. The test of any particular dic-
tum’s validity is not defined by its immediate audience but by its effi-
cacy for future courts. Dicta’s virtue is precisely this: It corrects the law
without betraying the law. Its very triviality explains dicta’s utility as a
source of equity within the modern legal regime.
Confronted with the contradiction that results from a flawed law,
a judge has only two choices. One is silence—a silence that risks the
mistake being repeated ad infinitum through precedent, like an ava-
lanche rolling down hill, sweeping everything in its path.339 The other
choice is protest. But this choice requires dicta; the demarcation of the
“correct” standard—whether that is good faith, or fairness, or pru-
dence—can only be articulated through an explication of the “incor-
rect” standard. The consequences of the defendant’s conduct must be
put on display for the entire world to see, or the insight is lost. This is
the internal logic of equitable dissonance made visible.
This logic reveals itself most clearly in hard cases. Like our experi-
ence of music, the mediation between past, future, and present in the
act of adjudicating hard cases is a gathering-together in which the
whole cannot be separated from its parts without destroying the es-
sence of the legal composition. Dicta is simply the most nuanced and
sophisticated example of this compositional technique.
Dicta, of course, is always potentially destabilizing. Analogous to
Wittgenstein’s method of “solving” philosophic problems, dicta dis-
solves conflicts between “this is unjust” and “but this is how it must be”
by revealing the existence of other possibilities for justice, other as-
pects of law previously undisclosed. But this also creates the dilemma
of knowledge in its audience. The ambiguous tension that dicta cre-
ates—what I have termed “equitable dissonance”—cannot be ignored
or forgotten. Once dicta reveals some new aspect of legal doctrine,
you cannot unsee it. Indeed, it’s the inability of the audience to forget
that is the real magic. Once introduced into legal discourse, disso-
nance carries an implicit demand for its own redemption. As Foucault
observes, discourses mutate and evolve—an evolution that exceeds
and is independent of any “author.”340 The power—indeed, the dan-
339. This choice is anathema to many, triggering Holmes’ famous “puke” test in prag-
matic judges. See Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, in THE REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM:
NEW ESSAYS ON SOCIAL THOUGHT, LAW, AND CULTURE 235–36 (Morris Dickstein ed., 1998)
(defining the Holmes’ famous test as follows: “A statute or other act of government violates
the Constitution if and only if it makes you want to throw up.”).
340. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 189–92 (A. M. Sheridan
Smith trans., Pantheon Books 1972) (1969); see also MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWL-
950 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46
ger—of dicta is that these philosophic ruptures may take on a life of
their own.
Dicta is something trivial and significant; superfluous and neces-
sary; neither this nor that, but both at the same time. This contradic-
tion is pregnant with meaning. The appearance of dicta in a
significant opinion typically signals a breakdown in the legal system. It
suggests that the law is not complete in itself. There is this something
else—this aporia—which the law can neither explain nor comprehend.
But if the law can be reduced to the facts, the holding, the rationes
decidendi, then what is this excess that is left over? The answer is simple
but not obvious. When you strip away all the trappings of law—the
holding, the facts, the black letter rules—what is left over is that which
is prior to and greater than the system of laws. The referent to which
this excess refers is justice. Speaking in the language of equity, dicta is a
mnemonic device par excellence. It remembers precisely that which the
law as a totalizing system seeks to veil and forget: the priority of justice
to the law.
Like dicta, justice is simultaneously immanent within yet external
to the system of laws it corrects in the exercise of equity. Without jus-
tice as an organizing heuristic, law would have no meaning for us. We
would perceive only a series of arbitrary decisions, generated more or
less at random, a play of conflicting interests from which only one
conclusion might be drawn: Law is the power of the sovereign to en-
force his will—and nothing more.341 But this insight forces us to recog-
nize the limits and boundaries of the law; the law’s contradictions can
only be resolved by reference to a greater consonance. Dicta retains its
power to shock because it reminds us of the equitable dialectic at play
between justice and law—a dialectic the legal system obscures and
elides.
To restate the essential premise, the paradox of the law is that
following the “rules” will sooner or later lead to lawful injustice. When
this transpires, the predictable outcome is the blare of dicta. Dicta
follows from a critical thinking about the contradiction of a defendant
who is both guilty and not guilty at the same time. And dicta as equita-
EDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS, 1972–1977, at 244–45 (Colin Gordon
ed., Colin Gordon et al. trans., Pantheon Books 1980); ALEC MCHOUL & WENDY GRACE, A
FOUCAULT PRIMER: DISCOURSE, POWER AND THE SUBJECT 3–4 (N.Y. Univ. Press 1997) (1993).
341. This was Holmes’ famously cynical view of the law. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES,
JR., JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: HIS BOOK NOTICES AND UNCOLLECTED LETTERS AND
PAPERS 21, 22 (Harry C. Shriver ed., 1936) (“[S]overeignty is a form of power, and the will
of the sovereign is law, because he has power to compel obedience or to punish disobedi-
ence, and for no other reason.”).
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ble remedy is the movement of this critical thinking as it attempts to
demarcate the boundaries between good faith and bad faith; pru-
dence and negligence; fairness and unconscionability. Indeed, the ul-
timate task of dicta is to mark the boundary between injustice and
justice itself.
In the hard case, the authorship of dicta is the necessary method
through which legal contradiction is both acknowledged and tran-
scended. This is not a form of judicial lawlessness, but a creative act
predicated on respect for the rule of law. Dicta allows a court to ad-
dress injustice, without doing injustice. Indeed, dicta’s greatest virtue
as remedy is its very in-significance, its lack of binding authority. Like
other forms of sublation, dicta preserves even as it transforms. Dicta is
thus a manifestation of equity in its most originary task: the correction
or supplementation of civil law.
Even in our experience of the most beautiful music, we hear dis-
sonance as conflict. The dissonant note begs resolution. It plagues the
ear like a guilty conscience. Our experience of the law is no different.
Where there is injustice, equitable dissonance cries out that our rules
are in conflict with our basic intuitions of what is fair and right; it is
the siren song of justice, calling us back to a forgotten home. Always
and again, the frisson of dicta shatters the illusion that our man-made
law is the final word. But in so doing, dicta reminds us of what is all
too often forgotten. Justice is our end; the law is only a means.
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